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1 Introduction
What type of debt should a government issue? A sizeable literature (see inter alia Angeletos (2002)
and Barro (2003)) studies optimal debt management (DM) using the canonical framework of a
Ramsey planner under full commitment, stochastic government expenditure and distortionary taxes.
This literature concludes that governments should focus on issuing long bonds. Based on a negative
covariance between deficits and long bond prices, issuing long bonds ensures that the market value
of debt falls when there is an adverse fiscal shock allowing the government to effectively complete
markets and smooth taxes.
Buera and Nicolini (2004) point out that the optimal portfolios emerging from this approach
feature very large long term debt issuance, by several multiples of GDP, and governments investing
in short term bonds. Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2010) show that introducing habits and capital
leads to bond positions which are even larger and more volatile and characterised by a negative
correlation between issuance of short and long bonds.
The above papers assume effectively complete markets but the importance of long bonds in
optimal DM can survive even when market completeness cannot be achieved. For instance, Lustig
et al. (2008) and Nosbusch (2008) rule out the ability of governments to invest in private assets and
find it is still optimal for governments to focus almost exclusively on long term debt.1,2
As we document in Section 2, US debt management is at odds with these recommendations.
Firstly the US government issues substantial amounts of short term debt with an average share of
debt under one year of 43%. This share is far from zero in all years, never falling below 24% in our
sample. Furthermore, the portfolio share of short bonds is relatively stable and highly persistent.
In addition, the government tends to increase the stock of both long and short bonds together in
response to a deficit shock.
Observed debt policy deviates from the optimal DM literature in yet another dimension. All
the papers mentioned so far assume that each period governments repurchase the whole stock of
previously issued bonds with this repurchase financed by freshly issued bonds. This can be described
as a repurchase/reissuance (r/r) operation.3 This assumption lends simplicity to the analysis as it
reduces the number of state variables. However assuming a full r/r is widely at odds with the data as
bonds are rarely repurchased before maturity, as documented for the US in Garbade and Rutherford
(2007), for OECD in Marchesi (2006) and Blommestein et al (2012) and for the UK in Ellison and
Scott (2017).
From the above studies one could draw the normative recommendation that governments should
issue a much larger share of long bonds and engage in r/r operations. However for the normative
1Lustig et al (2008) use a monetary model to demonstrate a further reason for long term debt: inflation is more
effective in lowering the debt burden when the deficit is high if long bonds have been issued.
2All of these papers assume that governments are creditworthy and can fully commit to their tax plans. A few
papers have moved away from these assumptions, of no default and full commitment. An older literature (Calvo (1988)
and Blanchard and Missale (1994)) considers moral hazard factors that lead governments to issue short term debt.
Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmulker (2013), Aguiar et al (2016) and Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012), Acharya and
Rajan (2013), explain the interaction between debt management and default. He and Xiong (2012) study the interplay
between liquidity and credit risks in the corporate bond market but their findings can also be applied to government
finances. Finally, Debortoli, Nunes and Yared (2016) show that modifying the Angeletos (2002) model to allow for
lack of commitment leads to an increase in long term interest rates such that governments issue substantial amounts
of short term debt as well as long term debt.
3To be precise, in a model where only 10-period bonds are issued, an r/r involves replacing long bonds issued last
year that have now 9-years to maturity, by new 10-year bonds.
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insights of a Ramsey model to be useful it is crucial that they remain robust. If optimal policy changes
considerably by introducing plausible bond markets frictions then the above normative implications
would be mute. With this motivation we systematically compare the data with the recommendations
that emerge from optimal DM under various financial frictions. Thus our approach mixes both
normative and positive analysis to study what key ingredients are needed to build a useful theory of
debt management that provides insights into the trade-offs policymakers face.
The central issue we address is the following. Full buyback involves very large repurchases and
reissuances (r/r) which could be costly if there are transaction costs of any type. These costs may
outweigh the fiscal insurance benefits and render r/r undesirable, changing the nature of optimal
DM policy. Indeed, our discussions with Debt Management Offices (DMO) reveal considerable
nervousness about the possibility of operating large scale r/r operations, with concerns expressed
over market disruption, transaction costs and fears that large scale purchases and issuances would
adversely affect bond prices. Thus we consider two questions around r/r operations: a) if a DMO
does not buy back debt does this have a substantive impact on optimal DM? and b) why might a
DMO choose not to buy back debt each period?
In Section 2 we outline observed features of US debt management. We argue that due to a number
of financial frictions DMOs may be reluctant to perform r/r ’s. This leads us to consider an extreme
”no-buyback” assumption, where bonds are never repurchased before maturity. This version of the
model is new to the literature.
No buyback imposes a limitation on the bond payments: under buyback long bonds issued in
period t pay something in period t+1 and nothing afterwards, so the timing of payments is the same
for long and short bonds. The only difference is that the long bonds’ payoff, namely their price in
the secondary market, is stochastic. By contrast, under no buyback a long bond pays a large amount
at maturity date but nothing before. Since no buybacks impose additional restrictions on bonds it is
of interest to address the issue of whether markets can be effectively completed under no buyback.
We show the answer is ’yes’ if enough maturities are available and the total market value of
bonds is subject to a No-Ponzi Game condition. However, the government achieves this outcome
by purchasing increasingly large amounts of private bonds whilst making large bond issuances, the
quantity of each bond going to infinity. Therefore complete markets does not seem like a useful
benchmark for studying the effect of forbidding r/r as the resulting bond positions involve ever
larger transactions and ever larger transaction costs under incomplete markets.
In Section 3 we begin our analysis of a) by introducing two sources of market incompleteness: we
assume that the number of states of nature is much larger (a continuum) than the number of bonds,
and we introduce bond limits that prevent huge bond positions from arising. We then outline two
extreme models - the first model has r/r, every period the government buys back all outstanding
debt and then reissues an optimal portfolio and the second model assums the government only buys
back at the prespecified maturity date. The first model is motivated by the existing optimal DM
literature and the second by empirical evidence on DM practice presented in Section 2.
Analysing optimal DM under these two extremes allows us to focus on the effects of the different
timing of cash flows discussed above. Through specific analytical cases in Section 3 we show how no
buyback reduces the attractiveness of long bonds. Firstly under no buyback whilst long bonds still
provide fiscal insurance this effect is attenuated. Secondly under no buyback issuing N period bonds
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introduces N cycles into taxes through lumpy rollovers of debt. By contrast issuing short tem debt
helps smooth cash flows and promotes tax smoothing.
To gain a deeper and more robust understanding of the impact of no buyback on optimal DM we
perform calibrated simulations. Solving such models under incomplete markets is computationally
demanding. This is particularly true in our case as not only are we looking at multiple assets
but also the set of available assets does not span the state space. Further under no buyback it
is necessary to keep track of all outstanding bonds and for large maturities this leads to a rapidly
expanding state space. A significant contribution of this paper is therefore Section 4 where we outline
a computational method, based on the Parameterized Expectations Algorithmn (PEA) of den Haan
and Marcet (1990) to solve for optimal portfolios globally. We confront two difficulties: i) the size
of the state space is very large and ii) using a standard formulation of first order conditions the
optimal portfolio choice is indeterminate. We solve the first issue by introducing the Condensed
PEA and the second through the Forward States PEA. The Condensed PEA significantly reduces
the size of the state space, by forming an initial solution to the model using a small size vector of core
state variables, and subsequently finding a few linear combinations of remaining state variables that
summarize these variables efficiently. We also use this idea to introduce relevant non-linear terms
of higher order, as these are often necessary for a good approximation. Forward States circumvents
indeterminacy by approximating the integrand terms inside the expectations at t with a function of
t + 1 state variables. Furthermore, Forward States promotes a good approximation by embedding
features of the correct solution into the approximations. These numerical procedures are likely to be
useful in many other applications involving large portfolios and large state spaces.
In Section 5 we use this solution method to examine optimal DM when the government can
issue both short and long term debt. We consider four different market environments: buyback/no-
buyback combined with unrestricted/non-negative bond issuance (lending/no-lending). We find that
the introduction of a no buyback constraint has substantial implications for optimal debt management
- now the government should issue short term debt, in some cases even more than long term debt;
portfolio shares are much more stable and persistent and the stock of both short and long run bonds
positively co-move. Viewed in this light, Ramsey policy does not seem to urge governments to issue
much larger amounts of long debt than at present.
These findings lead us to consider our second substantive issue around DM. The full r/r as-
sumption in the buyback model enables the government to fully utilise the covariance of long bonds
with fiscal deficit shocks, thus it achieves fiscal insurance - why would an optimising government
avoid r/r operations? We turn to the analysis of this issue by explicitly introducing transaction
costs. In the first part of Section 6 we perform a shadow cost computation of transaction costs by
valuing the utility loss from buyback and no-buyback using Lagrange Multipliers from the extreme
(buyback/nobuyback) cases of Section 5. Based on a U.S calibration of transaction costs we show
that the no buyback solution leads to higher levels of welfare than the canonical r/r assumption.
We then solve for DM when repurchases are chosen optimally under transaction costs. We find that
the government hardly ever chooses to buy back debt before its maturity date, it only does on rare
occasions when fiscal surpluses are very large. Optimal DM involves issuing a portfolio of both short
and long bonds much more consistent with the basic facts in the data displayed in Section 2.
In Section 7 we turn to the robustness of our results. A relatively unexamined feature of observed
4
DM is the fact that bonds pay a fixed semi annual coupon. The existence of coupons becomes more
important under no buyback, as coupons effectively mimic the cash flow of short bonds and so can
be thought of as a security design aimed at mitigating the no buyback restriction. We first show that
fixed coupons cannot complete the markets and then apply our simulation techniques to compare
the model with the data. We also explore the effects of introducing a third bond under no buyback.
We finally introduce a simple form of callable bonds. In all these cases we find very little influence
on our debt management implications - governments should still issue long term bonds to achieve
fiscal insurance but need to issue short term bonds to smooth cash flows and short and long bond
positions should be positively correlated. Intuitively long bonds help smooth taxes over states and
short bonds help smooth taxes over time. Finally we look at issues of accuracy of solutions and a
final section concludes.
2 US Government Debt Management
This Section documents stylised facts about the U.S Treasury’s management of marketable govern-
ment debt4 held by the public over the period 1955-2015. We use these facts as guidance for the
interpretation and robustness of the optimal policy recommendations arising from Ramsey models
and to uncover the ingredients that are important for the analysis of DM.
The full details of our data and calculations are contained in Appendix A. We use data from the
CRSP about gross government debt issued. As a reference, we classify as ”short” debt payments
due in less than one year and as ”long” debt payments due in over a year. Most of our stylised facts
are quoted based on converting bonds into a zero coupon form (e.g coupon payments are treated as
a separate bond with a maturity date set to when the coupon is paid) so when we refer to “short“
or “long“ term bonds we are referring to redemption and coupon payments that are due in either
before or after one year.
Figure 1 shows the share of the market value of short bonds as a proportion of the total market
value of U.S government debt (St) and reveals :
Fact 1 Portfolio shares of long and short maturities are both substantial.
On average St is 43% and ranges between 24% and 57%.
Fact 2 Portfolio shares are never close to zero or negative.
Fact 3 Portfolio shares are highly stable over time, with a low standard deviation and high serial
correlation.
The first order serial correlation of St is 0.94 and its standard deviation 0.078.
[ Figure 1 About Here ]
4Our focus is on the Treasury’s DM practice, hence we leave aside the Federal Reserve balance sheet from our
statistics. The QE bond purchases by the Fed during the financial crisis were a component of ”non-conventional”
monetary policy. They were viewed as part of the transmission of monetary policy rather than optimal debt manage-
ment. As such they relate to mechanisms that lie outside the models of the DM literature surveyed in the introduction
and outside the scope of this paper. As in the rest of the literature our focus is on the interaction between DM and
fiscal policy only. Hence we do not take into account QE bond purchases in our empirical analysis. We could avoid
the issue of how to treat QE purchases by using data only up to 2008. The DM moments in the first column of Table
4 change slightly for this subsample, but they are still in full agreement with our description of Facts 1-7.
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The underlying data also shows:
Fact 4 Short debt is positively correlated with long term debt.
The correlation between St and the same ratio for long debt is 0.86.
5 In other words, the govern-
ment issues both short and long debt in response to a deficit shock.
All of these facts are in sharp contrast to the optimal DM recommendations from available
Ramsey models with effectively complete markets. These usually produce very large issuance of
long bonds, large short (negative) positions on short bonds, and, in models with time-varying bond
positions such as Faraglia, Marcet and Scott (2010), considerable volatility and a negative correlation
between short and long issuance. Facts 1-2 are also unlike the models with non-negativity constraints
on bond issuances, as in Nosbusch (2008) and Lustig et al. (2008), where St = 0 frequently.
Our focus is on models of incomplete markets and in this environment the timing of cash flows
matters. This is what motivates our remaining stylised facts which focus on the timing of cash flows
by the Treasury - specifically around when they buy back bonds from investors.
Figure 2 shows the total issuance of government debt (long and short) each period over the total
stock of debt held and illustrates the following.6
[ Figure 2 About Here ]
Fact 5 The ratio of total (gross) bond issuance over the stock of outstanding debt is never close to
100%.
More specifically, this ratio is never larger than 60%. This is in sharp contrast to the available
optimal DM literature where the assumption of full r/r each period causes the above ratio to fluctuate
around 100%.7
To better understand government behaviour around buying back debt before maturity we examine
the dates at which the US Treasury has bought back bonds over our sample period. Consider first
the case of non-callable bonds. As shown in Table 1, for the whole sample 99.8% of all long maturity
government debt is redeemed either at maturity or within a year of its stated maturity date (and
98.86% one quarter before maturity). As mentioned in the introduction, this practice is not confined
to the US but is standard practice across the OECD. This leads us to state
[ Table 1 About Here ]
Fact 6 Non-callable long bonds are effectively redeemed only at their maturity date and not before.
We have found that the extent to which governments rarely buy back debt before maturity is not
widely known. This seems to be based on an awareness of the buybacks that occurred in the 1920s
and between 2000-2001 as well as with the previously widespread use of callable bonds. However our
dataset does extend as far back as the 1920s so this period is included in our analysis. Further whilst
5In calculating this correlation we divide by GDP to remove non-stationarity. The high correlation remains under
alternative detrending techniques. For example, using a linear trend we obtain a correlation of 0.84 and with a linear
quadratic trend the correlation is 0.79. We conclude that the high correlation of fluctuations in long and short debt
is robust to detrending.
6See the Appendix A for details on how the series displayed in Figure 2 was constructed.
7Assuming that on average the primary deficit is in balance and that there is no nominal GDP growth.
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the government did repurchase outstanding long bonds before maturity this was due to large and
persistent budget surpluses and was done to avoid running down issues of short maturity bills8. In
other words, this is an example of a true repurchase and not a r/r.
Closer examination of the case of callable bonds is also not supportive of the buyback assumption.
Callable bonds are long maturity government debt which embed an option for the government to
redeem the principal (at par) prior to maturity. The period prior to maturity containing the dates
when the bond can be redeemed (or recalled) is dubbed the ”call window”. As shown in Figure 3
in 1955 around 50% of long bonds outstanding were callable although this declined to around 10%
by the early 70s before rising once again. The last column of Table 2 shows the fraction of every
issuance of callable bonds which has been redeemed prior to the maturity date. Aside from a few
cases in the late 50s/early 60s it is typical for all callable debt to be bought back before maturity,
i.e. for the government to exercise the option to redeem it before the bond matures.
[ Figure 3 About Here ]
[ Table 2 About Here ]
Given the magnitude of callable bonds in the first half of our sample and that they were nearly
always redeemed before maturity it may seem that the ”buyback” assumption may be relevant after
all. However closer inspection shows this not to be the case.
Firstly, in nearly every case the callable bonds were bought back within the call window and often
at the first date in the call window. Table 3 counts the call windows for all callable bonds issued by
the US during this time period. The first row shows that there were three five-year callable bonds
issued and they all had a call window which started two years from their maturity date, i.e. once
the bonds had been outstanding for three years. It shows that all ten-year callable bonds could be
recalled only two years prior to maturity at the earliest, and so on. Furthermore, Figure 4 shows the
year callable bonds were redeemed within the call window, for different call windows. We see that
around 80% of debt is repurchased at the first opportunity in the call window across maturities, and
the remaining debt is repurchased within a year of the stated original redemption date.
[ Table 3 About Here ]
[ Figure 4 About Here ]
Whilst debt managers exercise call options, they do not buyback callable bonds before the callable
window starts, and since call windows are close to maturity it means that most callable long bonds
are recalled close to their maturity date. Further, an important feature of the buyback of callable
bonds is that it is made at par and not the prevailing market price for bonds which is an important
distinction from the usual r/r assumption.
Therefore we have
Fact 7 Most callable bonds in the US are redeemed at their first call date. For long bonds the first
call date is most commonly close to the redemption date.
8Garbade and Rutherford (2007) document the details of the 2000-2001 buyback.
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Facts 5-7 suggest that bonds issued by the Treasury tend to stay in private hands until maturity.
Only callable bonds, which are a declining fraction of long debt, were redeemed before maturity but
even in this case they were redeemed close to maturity and at par, not market value.
In a section aimed at summarising the practical operation of debt management it is worth con-
sidering what market features might explain the near nonexistence of r/r ’s in practice. In seeking
an answer to this question we have held various informal discussions with debt management officers.
In short, their answers are that DMO’s are mainly worried about issuing cheaply, and for this they
need to promote bond market stability. This response is broadly consistent with models such as
Greenwood and Vayanos (2010), Gorton, Levellen and Metrick (2012), Guibaud et al (2013), Green-
wood et al (2015) and Quinn and Roberds (2017) which emphasise investors being attracted to liquid
and safe assets where bonds function as money or investors having a strong preference for particular
habitats. In this environment large repurchases or sales are costly to manage and may disrupt the
market9. Only in a debt reduction environment might buybacks be needed in order to maintain a
desirable mix of maturities. However even this is not strictly speaking an r/r operation but a ”pure
repurchase” without reissuance.
In general we can think of three different reasons why r/r may be costly and all three we capture
under the term “transaction costs”. The first are simply the resources required to run the govern-
ment’s debt management office e.g buildings, personnel, equipment. It seems these are fixed costs
the Treasury would have to pay anyway to run its issuance operations and so are unlikely to influence
whether buyback or no buyback is optimal. The second category is due to the existence of bid-ask
spreads (as documented by Amihud and Mendelson (1991) and Engle et al (2012)). A bid-ask spread
will make full scale r/r every period more expensive by creating a wedge between the buying and
selling price. The third category of transaction costs arise from price pressures and the belief that the
supply and demand curves for government bonds are not perfectly elastic so issuing or purchasing
more of specific bonds will influence the market price10. Lou, Yan and Zhang (2013), Breedon and
Turner (2016) and Song and Zhu (2016) all derive estimates of how bond prices are influenced by
large scale purchases or issues of government debt. As with bid-ask spreads, the existence of these
”auction effects” will add additional costs to r/r which may make buyback suboptimal. In Section
6 we calibrate these costs and see if they can explain why governments do not perform r/r opera-
tions. For now we simply advance that DMOs tend to offer these facts as a reason for the absence
of buybacks documented by Facts 5-7.
9In a related paper, Faraglia, Marcet, Oikonomou and Scott (2017) outline a three period model where the gov-
ernment has superior information than investors around future public finances. This informational asymmetry, in a
similar spirit to Myers and Majluf (1984), generates the result that the government chooses not to buy back previously
issued debt before maturity. Doing so triggers a bond market shut down as investors believe that the government is
trying to reschedule its debt ahead of poor public finances.
10A particular concern of debt managers are “auction failures”. Given the size of government debt there are frequent
issues of new debt and an orderly market requires these to be sold at or near prevailing market prices. Large scale
issues which go unsold or create market volatility are perceived as very damaging. This fear naturally produces a
conservatism in issuance and a reluctance to do r/r as that would increase the number and scale of auctions and
increase the probability of an auction failure.
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3 The Model
In this section we compare the extreme assumption of full r/r with the opposite extreme where
the government lets bonds stay in the hands of private investors until their redemption date. In
Section 6.3 we will examine a model with transaction costs where each period the government can
choose how much to repurchase. If we found that the case of buyback produces similar portfolio
recommendations as no buyback then pursuing the modelling of transaction costs and the complexity
of partial buybacks would be an unnecessary distraction. The extreme cases discussed in this section
are useful for simplicity and to provide useful intuition for the transaction cost case.
For both the case of buyback and no buyback we examine the Ramsey policy equilibrium with
perfect commitment and two bonds.11 Essentially it can be seen as adding a long bond to the model
of Aiyagari et al. (2002). We also follow the literature and consider the existence of a non-negativity
constraint on bond issuance.
We assume a single representative household whose preferences over consumption, ct, and leisure,
xt, are given by E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t [u(ct) + v(xt)] , where u and v are strictly increasing and strictly concave
functions, they satisfy Inada conditions to avoid corners for c, x, and 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor.
The economy produces a single good that cannot be stored. The household is endowed with T
units of time that it allocates between leisure and labour. Technology for every period t is given by:
(1) ct + gt = T − xt
where gt represents government expenditure which is assumed to be stochastic and exogenous and
is the only source of uncertainty in the model. The representative firm maximizes profits. Both the
household and the firm take prices and taxes as given.
The government engages in the following activities to finance spending: First, it levies distor-
tionary taxes τt on labor income and second, it issues debt. Bond issuance of the government at
period t is a vector bt = (b
S
t , b
N
t ) where N denotes the long and S the short bond. Both are real,
zero-coupon, riskless bonds: the short (long) bond promises to pay one unit of consumption in S
(N) periods with certainty, we take the integer S ≥ 1 to be much lower than the integer N . Let pit
be the price of a bond of maturity i = 1, . . . , N with p0t = 1.
In the standard case with buyback the period-t government budget constraint can be written as:
(2)
∑
i={S,N}
bitp
i
t =
∑
i={S,N}
bit−1p
i−1
t + gt − τt(T − xt)
The left side of this equation is the value of the bond portfolio issued this period. The first term
on the right side is the market value of debt outstanding and gt − τt(T − xt) is the primary deficit.
Notice that with this constraint the government is assumed to perform a full repurchase/reissuance
operation (r/r) every period.
In the case where government debt is held to maturity i.e no buyback, then the government’s
11Our benchmark model is purposefully simplistic allowing the government to issue debt in short and long bonds
and in Section 7 we will also consider a third asset. Though government portfolios are indeed more complex in reality,
the work of Piazzesi and Schneider (2010) shows that parsimonious portfolios, with a few zero coupon bonds, can span
payoffs of more complex portfolios.
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budget constraint becomes:
(3)
∑
i∈{S,N}
bitp
i
t =
∑
i∈{S,N}
bit−i + gt − τt(T − xt).
The left hand side of (3) once more corresponds to the market value of new debt issued in period
t but the first term on the right hand side now measures not the total value of debt outstanding
but instead the total value of debt maturing that period. Even though the government issues only
ever issues two kinds of bonds, at any point in time there are N kinds of bonds outstanding, namely
(b1t + b
N
t−N+1, b
N
t−N+2..., b
N
t ). Even though non-maturing bonds do not show up in the government’s or
consumer’s budget constraint at t they may nonetheless affect the actions of agents since they influ-
ence the income that will be available in the future. The maturity of previously issued bonds declines
each period - long bonds issued today will eventually become short bonds as they approach their
redemption date. This provides a mechanical channel whereby for a given proportion of long/short
bonds issued, the overall portfolio shows a greater reliance on short bonds than under the case of
full buyback.
Under market incompleteness it is standard to allow for ad-hoc limits that constrain bit (see
Aiyagari et al. (2002))12
(4)
M i
βi
≤ bit ≤
M i
βi
for some |M i| ,
∣∣M i∣∣ < ∞. In the case where M i < 0 the government can purchase private bonds,
this is ruled out when M i = 0 (as in Lustig et al. (2008) and Nosbusch (2008)). We shall refer
to the latter as the “No Lending“ case. The upper bound M i plays several roles. It is a simple
way of introducing transaction costs for large issuances, with an infinite cost of issuing more than
M i/β
i and zero cost of issuing below this bound in a given period. Under this interpretation it is
reasonable to calibrate M i so that it gives a level of average debt roughly as in the data. In section
6 we will introduce a more involved transaction costs function that matches better actual costs of
issuing bonds, and we will allow for r/r. Another practical reason for using this bound is that it
helps to stabilize the simulations, as noted by Maliar and Maliar (2003). Notice that in (4) we scale
both the upper and lower bounds of maturity i by the steady state price of debt for that maturity
pi = βi (see formula for prices in section 3.1). We will keep this convention across all economies
considered with different types of bonds. This facilitates the interpretation of the M ’s as they are in
units of the (steady state) market value of debt issued each period for each type of bonds available.
In the case of no buyback we have to modify these constraints as the amount of debt outstanding
per period is no longer given by debt issued that period. Then, given the issuances between t
and t − N + 1, the market value of debt in N bonds still outstanding using steady state prices is:∑N
j=1 β
jbNt−N+j. Therefore we normalize the debt constraints for i = {S,N} as
(5)
M i∑i
j=1 β
j
≤ bit ≤
M i∑i
j=1 β
j
.
12As in Aiyagari et al. (2002) we assume for simplicity that the debt limits that the government faces are tighter
than the consumer’s debt limits, thus the consumer is always at the margin.
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Note that, for the same M ’s, this puts the same limits as for the case of buyback on the steady state
value of debt in each bond and, therefore, the same limits for the total market value of debt.
3.1 Ramsey Problem
As is standard in the Ramsey policy literature we assume the government chooses tax and bond
policies knowing the implied equilibrium quantities and seeking to maximize household utility. We
first summarize the competitive equilibrium in a few equations.
The consumer budget constraint is analogous to (2) or (3). In a standard manner we derive from
the maximization problem of the consumer the equilibrium bond prices condition pit = β
iEt(
uc,t+i
uc,t
),
where uc,t ≡ u′(ct) and equilibrium condition for taxes τt = 1 − vx,tuc,t . Substituting these conditions
and using the budget constraint under buyback we obtain the implementability conditions
(6)
∑
i∈{S,N}
bitEt
(
βiuc,t+i
)
=
∑
i∈{S,N}
bit−1Et
(
βi−1uc,t+i−1
)
+ gtuc,t − (uc,t − vx,t)(gt + ct)
for all t a.s. As argued in Aiyagari et al. (2002) it is not possible to simplify further under incomplete
markets, (6) has to be imposed for all t. For the no buyback case we get
(7)
∑
i∈{S,N}
bitEt
(
βiuc,t+i
)
=
∑
i∈{S,N}
bit−iuc,t + gtuc,t − (uc,t − vx,t)(gt + ct).
Using standard arguments we have that
{
ct, b
S
t , b
N
t
}
is a competitive equilibrium if and only if it
satisfies the implementability constraint (6) (or (7)) and debt limits (4) (or (5)) almost surely for all
t. The Ramsey equilibrium solves a planner’s problem choosing sequences
{
ct, b
S
t , b
N
t
}
to maximize
the household’s utility subject to (6) (or (7)) and (4) (or (5)) a.s. for all t. The Lagrangean for the
planner’s problem under buyback is :
(8) L = E0
∑
t
βt
u(ct) + v(T − ct − gt) + λt[ ∑
i∈{S,N}
bitβ
iuc,t+i −
∑
i∈{S,N}
bit−1β
i−1uc,t+i−1
− gtuc,t + (uc,t − vx,t)(gt + ct)] +
∑
i∈{S,N}
ξiU,t(
M i
βi
− bit) +
∑
i∈{S,N}
ξiL,t(b
i
t −
M i
βi
)
 .
Here ξiL,t and ξ
i
U,t denote the multipliers on the lower and upper bounds respectively and λt is the
multiplier of (6).
Under no buyback the corresponding Lagrangean is
(9) L = E0
∑
t
βt
u(ct) + v(T − ct − gt) + λt[ ∑
i∈{S,N}
bitβ
iuc,t+i −
∑
i∈{S,N}
bit−iuc,t
− gtuc,t + (uc,t − vx,t)(gt + ct)] +
∑
i∈{S,N}
ξiU,t(
M i∑i
j=1 β
j
− bit) +
∑
i∈{S,N}
ξiL,t(b
i
t −
M i∑i
j=1 β
j
)

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3.2 Optimality Conditions under Buyback
In the case of buyback the first order conditions are:
uc,t − vx,t + λt [ucc,tct + uc,t + vxx,t(ct + gt)− vx,t] +
+ucc,t
∑
i∈{S,N}
(λt−i − λt−i+1)bit−i = 0(10)
βiEt (uc,t+iλt − uc,t+iλt+1) + ξiL,t − ξiU,t = 0 for i = S,N.(11)
Equation (10) represents the first order optimaliy condition of consumption and (11) of bit. For the
case of loose debt limits we have ξiL,t = ξ
i
U,t = 0. Then, using the arguments of Aiyagari et al. (2002)
we see that (11) states that λt = Etuc,t+iλt+1/Et(uc,t+i) which evolves as a risk-adjusted random
walk with two risk measures, namely uc,t+i/Et(uc,t+i) for i = S,N .
Extending the argument in Marcet and Marimon (2012) the optimal solution has a recursive
formulation where the optimal tax schedule may be written as:
τt = τ(Xt) for(12)
Xt = (gt, λt−1, λt−2, . . . ., λt−N , bSt−1, . . . , b
S
t−S, b
N
t−1, . . . , b
N
t−N)(13)
for a time-invariant function τ(·) as long as we constrain λ−1 = . . . = λ−N = 0.
The reason that N lags of λ and b are needed as state variables is because they contain the
relevant information from the past needed to implement the full commitment solution. Faraglia et
al. (2016) explain in detail the nature of the promises made under full commitment, they show
optimal policy involves ”interest rate twisting”: if gt is high the government can partly offset this
adverse shock by promising lower taxes at t + N, as this increases ct+N , lowering the cost of long
bonds currently issued pNt and it lowers the increase in τt needed to maintain solvency. This promise
is implemented mechanically in a recursive form by the term
∑
i∈{S,N}(λt+N−i − λt+N−i+1)bit+N−i,
which appears in the optimality condition (10) at t+N to implement the tax cut that was promised
when the high gt was observed. Once we realise that λt−S, λt−S+1, λt−N , λt−N+1 enter (10) at t it is
clear that all the λ’s and bN ’s between t− 1 and t−N matter for the decision at t, since all the tax
cuts previously promised influence the total discounted tax revenue that the government can raise
between t and t + N. Initial λ’s are set to zero because in full commitment Ramsey solutions no
promises from the past that are relevant at t = 0.
This is why the state space for this solution is so large, the dimension of Xt is 2N + S + 1. In
the very simple model below, when we take S = 1 and N = 10, this amounts to 22 state variables.
Solving this model is computationally demanding because of the magnitude of the state space and in
the next section we outline a new computational method which offers an efficient solution procedure.
3.3 Optimality Conditions under No Buyback
The model in section 3.2 under buyback is analogous to others in the literature whereas the focus
of the paper is on the implications of assuming no buyback. In this case the first order optimality
conditions for consumption and bonds are
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uc,t − vx,t + λt [ucc,tct + uc,t + vxx,t(ct + gt)− vx,t] +
+ucc,t
∑
i∈{S,N}
(λt−i − λt)bit−i = 0(14)
βiEt(uc,t+iλt − uc,t+iλt+i) + ξiL,t − ξiU,t = 0 for i = S,N(15)
Now we have that off corners λt = Etuc,t+Sλt+S/Et(uc,t+S) and λt = Etuc,t+Nλt+N/Et(uc,t+N). The
only difference between the martingale result here and the one under buyback is that we now have
λt+i instead of λt+1. Therefore under no buyback λt shows more complex dynamics displaying (risk-
adjusted) cycles of periodicity S and N. As we discuss in detail below this is because under no
buyback a shock to the budget constraint today impacts on the budget constraint S and N periods
ahead, as the bonds issued to absorb today’s shock will only affect budget constraints in those terms.
Long bonds under no buyback provide less possibilities for fiscal insurance because the available
bonds do not allow smoothing of shocks across all periods, but in cycles of S and N periods.
Although the first order conditions are different the state vector is the same as under buyback so
the optimal allocation satisfies (12)-(13).
3.4 Effectively Complete vs. ”Truly” Incomplete Markets
We now study a case where, in our model with riskless bonds, the complete market allocation is
reached. This serves to highlight available results in the literature on DM, to show how they are
related to our formulation and to set up the notation that will be used throughout the paper.
Throughout the paper we use the following notation. Let gt = (g0, g1, ..., gt). Denote the primary
government surplus as st = τ t(T −xt)− gt for equilibrium taxes τt = 1− vx,tuc,t and feasible allocations.
For a given allocation {ct} denote expected present discounted value of surpluses as
(16) zt(g
t−1, gt) ≡ Et
∞∑
i=0
βi
uc,t+i
uc,t
st+i.
3.4.1 Buyback
As noted by Angeletos (2002) and Buera and Nicolini (2004) (ABN hereafter), optimal DM in the
framework of section 3.2 implements the complete market allocations if the bounds M are sufficiently
large in absolute value and the government issues only long bonds. Let us now prove the ABN result
using the optimality conditions derived above. For more details on the derivations in this subsection,
see Online Appendix A.1.
Assume gt is a Markov process taking only two possible values (g
H , gL), one-period bonds S = 1
and (without loss of generality) g0 = g
H . Denote by
{
cCMt
}
the complete market allocation. As is
well known, cCMt = c
H , cL contingent on gt, for values c
H , cL constant through time for t ≥ N .
We guess and verify that constant λt = ∆ and ξ
i
j,t = 0 satisfy all the first order conditions. First,
it is obvious that λt = ∆ and ξ
i
j,t = 0 satisfies the martingale condition (11). As pointed out by
Aiyagari et al. (2002), in this case consumption solving (10) is the same as
{
cCMt
}
. If we can find
bond holdings
{
b1t , b
N
t
}
satisfying bond limits and budget constraints for this consumption allocation
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and the corresponding equilibrium prices and taxes, we will have proved markets are effectively
complete.
To find such
{
b1t , b
N
t
}
, substitute equilibrium conditions in the budget constraint to give
(17) b1t−1 + p
N−1
t b
N
t−1 = zt ∀t, a.s.
The variables z and pN−1 that correspond to
{
cCMt
}
can only take two values (zH , zL) and (pN−1H , p
N−1
L )
for t ≥ N. Therefore (17) defines two equations for i = H,L that can be used to show that the port-
folio
b1t = B
BB
N ≡
zH − zL
pN−1H − pN−1L
(18)
bNt = B
BB
1 ≡ zH − pN−1H BBBN for all t ≥ N(19)
satisfies (17) for all periods. Hence this portfolio supports
{
cCMt
}
, markets are effectively complete
in the optimum. As noted by ABN, the key properties of the solution are: i) the issuance of each
security is constant over time and, ii) since zH < zL and pN−1H < p
N−1
L it is clear from the above
equations that BBBN > 0 and B
BB
N < 0 i.e. issue long and invest short.
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A constant issuance effectively completes markets because long bond prices and the primary
deficit are perfectly negatively correlated: a high g brings about a high deficit and a lower price of
long bonds, hence bNt > 0 means that debt servicing goes down with a higher deficit, and in this
way the left side of (17) can equal the right side a.s. Roughly speaking, the level of b’s are chosen
to match total debt, while the difference BBBN − BBB1 generates a variability of the value of debt
matching the variability in z.
The intuition about why λt is constant is straightforward: under complete markets higher (dis-
counted) income at t > 0 provides the same marginal increase in utility as a higher income in period
t = 0, since all that matters for the solution is total discounted wealth at t = 0. Therefore under
complete markets λt is non-stochastic. As long as the corresponding allocations are also feasible
under incomplete markets (as shown by the above derivations) then λt is constant under incomplete
markets as well.
3.4.2 No buyback
As mentioned previously, no buyback has been mostly ignored in the academic literature on optimal
policy in macro and bond portfolios in finance. There is a common presumption that no buyback
is an unnecessary complication that only serves to multiply the number of state variables and is
presumably irrelevant under complete markets. In this section we first show that in the no buyback
model of Section 3.3 markets can be effectively complete, supporting the presumption of nobuyback
is irrelevant. But then we show that the portfolios needed for this purpose would have ever larger
transaction costs. Some details are left to Online Appendix A.2.
Assume g and S as in Section 3.4.1. As with buyback, constant λt and ξ
i
j,t = 0 satisfy the
martingale condition (15) and give rise to complete markets allocations. We now check if it is
possible to find bonds
{
b1t , b
N
t
}
satisfying bond limits and budget constraints for this allocation.
13Strictly speaking some more assumptions are needed, see Online Appendix A.1.
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Now there are N kinds of bonds outstanding at the beginning of period t, each bond with
i = 0, ..., N − 1 periods left to maturity and held in the amounts (b1t−1 + bNt−N , bNt−N+1, ..., bNt−1, ).
Adding and subtracting the value of outstanding bonds held by the government
∑N−1
i=1 p
N−i
t b
N
t−i to
both sides of (3) and using that in equilibrium pit = Et(p
i−j
t+jp
j
t) we substitute forward to see that,
analogous to (17), the equilibrium value of all bonds outstanding has to equal the discounted sum of
surpluses:
(20)
N∑
j=1
pN−jt b
N
t−j + b
1
t−1 = zt ∀t a.s.
Steady State To find the steady state of bond issuances compatible with complete markets, set
bNt = B
ss,NBB
N and b
1
t = B
ss,NBB
1 for all t and all g
t, and zt = z
H , zL in (20) to find
Bss,NBBN =
zH − zL∑N−1
j=1
(
pjH − pjL
)(21)
Bss,NBB1 = z
H −
N−1∑
j=0
pjHB
ss,NBB
N .(22)
As with buyback, Bss,NBBN > 0, B
ss,NBB
1 < 0 generically.
Since
∣∣∣∑N−1i=0 pi,H − pi,L∣∣∣ > ∣∣pN−1,H − pN−1,L∣∣ the amount of bonds issued each period is lower
under no buyback. Clearly, a given amount total debt involves issuing less each period if bonds are
not repurchased. Therefore transaction costs (if there are any) of issuing bonds will be lower with
no buyback.
Stability of the steady state Clearly, convergence to steady state was very quick in the model
under buyback: in section 3.4.1 bonds go from their initial condition b1−1, b
N
−1 to the steady state
BBB1 , B
BB
N in N periods. This is because first order conditions are time-invariant for t ≥ N (see
Online Appendix A.1).
Let us now examine convergence to a steady state under no buyback. Equations (18), (20) at gH
and gL and simple algebra show that if
{
cCMt
}
is implemented the ”true” dynamics of bN satisfy
(23) bNt = B
BB
N +
N−2∑
i=1
piH − piL
pN−1L − pN−1H
bNt−i
for all t ≥ N , given initial bonds bN−j, j = 1, ..., N − 2.
Therefore, to effectively complete markets bNt should satisfy a deterministic linear difference equa-
tion of order N − 2. It is trivial to check that convergence to steady state will generically fail. For
example, in the case N = 3, and using the approximation pij ' βiKj for all i and j = H,L, (23)
gives the approximation
(24) bNt ' BBBN −
1
β
bNt−1.
Therefore, except for very special initial conditions, bNt does not converge to B
ss,NBB
N . To effec-
tively complete markets bNt has to oscillate between positive and negative values and
∣∣bNt ∣∣ → ∞
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geometrically at a rate β−1 > 1. Therefore we have the following
Result Optimal DM achieves the complete markets solution under no buyback if constraints (5)
are replaced by bounds on total value of debt: M ≤ ∑Nj=1 pN−ji bNt−j + b1t−1 ≤ M, for M,−M
sufficiently large. Under bond limits such as (5) and N > 2 markets cannot be generically completed.
Obviously, gross issuance satisfying (24) would be infeasible even with minor transaction costs of
the type considered in Section 6. Therefore, under no buyback we obtain a result analogous to ABN,
but the implementation of the optimal solution would be even extremely costly in the presence of
transaction costs.
3.4.3 ”Truly” Incomplete markets
In the case where g takes a continuum of possible values the complete markets allocation
{
cCMt
}
cannot be implemented. To see this, for a given gt−1, denote by f(·) ≡ zt(gt−1, ·) the discounted sum
corresponding to
{
cCMt
}
in the right side of (17). Thus, f is a pre-specified function of a continuum
of values gt. Similarly, bond prices corresponding to
{
cCMt
}
h(·) ≡ pN−1t (gt−1, ·) give a different
pre-specified function h of gt. It would be a coincidence if there were constants K1, K2 such that
K1 + K2h = f for all values of g. Therefore one cannot find bond values
(
b1t−1, b
N
t−1
)
for which (17)
holds for all values of gt,
{
cCMt
}
cannot be implemented and markets are truly incomplete.14
Deficits and long bond prices are still conditionally perfectly negatively correlated, as they are
both a function of gt only, but the dependence of the value of bonds on g is not sufficient to offset
the variability in zt that is needed to effectively complete markets. As emphasized in Aiyagari et al.
(2002) and Angeletos (2002) (20) becomes an active constraint, restricting allocations that can be
chosen today as a function of past bonds.
Therefore, markets can not be effectively complete with two bonds and a continuous g, both with
buyback and no buyback. A constant multiplier λt and ξ = 0 may not arise, therefore the martingale
conditions stated after (11) or (15) have to hold stochastically. Intuitively,15 what happens is that the
marginal utility from an additional unit of income depends on the wealth at t namely
(
b1t−1, b
N
t−1
)
and
under incomplete markets wealth is uncertain as it depends on the whole realisation gt−1, causing λt
to be random.
The presence of bond limits (4) and (5) introduces a further reason that prevents complete
markets from arising with these limits playing the role of a transaction cost function as explained
below equation (4). Under buyback the bond limit is likely to be binding for calibrated bounds M ,
but under no buyback it is binding for any value of M as stated in the Result at the end of section
3.4.2. Hence, the bond limits are more constraining under no buyback, and the optimal allocation is
likely to be even further away from complete markets.
An additional effect comes from the fact that now there are bonds of many maturities outstanding.
As pointed out by ABN, issuing long bonds helps with tax smoothing, since both long bond prices
and z go down with a high realisation of g. But because of no buyback all outstanding bonds issued
over the past N periods now influence the dynamics of the value of total debt outstanding, and
14This explanation echoes the argument in Aiyagari et al. (2002), although their one-bond case is simpler to
demonstrate.
15See the last paragraph of section 3.4.1 about the intuition for a constant λ under complete markets.
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fluctuations in z cannot be absorbed as they were with buyback due to previously issued outstanding
long bonds. In effect, under no buyback, long bonds become short bonds reducing their ability to
provide fiscal insurance.
3.4.4 N cycles
Long bonds under no buyback introduce an additional problem - they add N cycles to taxes and so
contribute to tax volatility rather than tax smoothing. To illustrate this point consider the following
special case :
i) no short bonds can be issued or purchased, that is MS = MS = 0;
ii) gt is deterministic and higher in the first period: g0 > g1 = g2 = . . . ;
iii) debt limits on the long bond are not binding
iv) bN−i = b for i = 1, . . . , N ;
Equation (15) for bNt gives:
(25) λt = λt+N for all t = 0, 1, . . . .
Furthermore λ1 = λ2 = . . . = λN−1 16.
Putting all this together implies that λ has a simple N − period cycle.
λtN = λ0 for t = 1, 2, . . .
λtN+i = λ for i = 1, . . . , N − 1, and t = 0, 1, 2, ... .
Equation (14) implies that this cycle also arises for consumption and taxes.
The evolution of taxes in this example is shown in Figure 5 assuming bN−i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , N .
The dashed line represents taxes when the government issues just a three year bond (N = 3), the
crossed line for a ten year bond (N = 10) and the solid line for when just a one year bond is issued.
Clearly taxes are more volatile under no buyback if only a long bond is issued. The higher tax needed
in period t = 0 because of high g0 reverberates every N periods, even if there are no further high
values of g. This in turn causes a large increase in taxes in future periods at intervals of N periods
ahead, while the high g0 has no effect on taxes in the intervening periods. Obviously the longer the
maturity of long bonds the greater the volatility in taxes at longer frequencies.
To understand the reason for this result notice that through forward iteration on the budget
constraint (3) we can express bonds today as follows
(26)
∑
j=0,N,2N,...
βj
uc,t+j
uc,t
(τt+j(T − xt+j)− gt+j) = bNt−N for all t.
To emphasize, notice the summation index is over j = 0, N, 2N, . . . This shows that if only one long
bond is issued taxes can only be compensated at t + N, t + 2N, . . . and intervening periods become
disconnected. Given the large value of g0 in assumption ii) above there is a rise in taxes and issuance
of debt in t = 0. But the new debt issued at t = 0 has to be redeemed in N years at which point taxes
have to increase to pay the accumulated interest and further debt has to be issued. It is pointless to
16To prove this notice that (25) and (14) imply ci = ci+Nt for i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 and all t = 1, 2, . . . Together with
(26) this implies uc,i(τi(T − xi)− g) = uc,ib(1− βN ), therefore ci = c and λi = λ, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1.
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increase taxes in intervening periods when spending is back at the steady state value. More precisely,
it is not possible to reduce τ0 by increasing, for example, τ1 or τ2. The additional tax revenue at
t = 2 cannot be utilized to reduce the debt accumulated at t = 0 if only long bonds are issued under
no buy back and short bonds are not available or at a limit. An increase in τ2 would only reduce
τ2+N and therefore induce even more volatility in the intervening periods.
[Figure 5 About Here]
This example is chosen to illustrate a stark result but the finding is robust. This is an implication
of the fact that λt+1 is replaced by λt+i in going from (11) to (15), generating an N -period cycle in
λ. One key result of this paper is that debt management can offset this N -period lumpiness through
issuing short term debt. Short debt helps offset tax volatility by distributing debt payments in
between these N−period cycles. Short bonds under no buyback have additional smoothing properties
over long bonds in general.
The above discussion suggests that assuming no buyback will influence optimal DM as it makes
long bonds less effective at providing fiscal insurance, induces N cycles in taxes and provides a tax
smoothing role for short bonds. What isn’t of course clear from this section is whether these channels
are quantitatively significant and for that we need to turn to simulations. However, as mentioned
above, solving Ramsey models under incomplete markets with multiple bonds is a computationally
challenging task and even more so under the assumption of no buyback. In the next section we
introduce two new computational methods that help significantly to produce numerical solutions of
this model.
4 The Solution Method
In solving our model we apply the widely used Parameterized Expectations Algorithm (PEA) of den
Haan and Marcet (1990). Solving our model requires introducing two modifications to PEA. The
first modification is necessary because the state vector Xt in our model may be very large requiring
a method to reduce the state space.17 The second modification is required because using PEA in the
standard way yields a system of equations that is indeterminate. We refer to the first modification
as Condensed PEA and to the second as the Forward States PEA. Whilst our focus is on a problem
of government debt management these computational methods have much wider applicability.18 In
order to set up the notation and to clarify the discussion we first give a description of PEA.
17Sometimes, in order to reduce the dimensionality of the state space, the literature has assumed bonds consist of
geometrically decaying coupons. One justification for this simplification is that the decay may capture a given portfolio
with decaying weights on higher bond maturities outstanding. Since the objective of this paper is to aim precisely
at explaining portfolio choices taking as fixed the weights of the bond portfolio seems self defeating. Furthermore,
Faraglia, Marcet, Oikonomou and Scott (2016) show, in the context of models of optimal fiscal policy, that this
approach is at best a weak approximation whilst Hilscher, Raviv, and Reis (2014) show that actual portfolio of bonds
outstanding is not geometrically decaying but hyperbolic.
18To conserve space we mention here only the principles of these methods. In the Online Appendix B we describe
the technical aspects of their implementation. Faraglia, Marcet, Oikonomou and Scott (2014) provide a detailed
description of how to solve many optimal fiscal policy problems with this extended PEA.
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4.1 The Conventional PEA Approach
We first describe how a standard application of PEA would proceed in this model. For the sake of
simplicity we focus on solving the model under buyback described in Section 3.2 when debt limits
are not binding. Given the vector Xt our aim is to solve the system of equations (6), (10) and (11) to
obtain the current value of consumption ct, the bond quantities b
i
t, i = S,N , and the multiplier λt.
Parameterized expectations requires approximating the terms Et(uc,t+i) and Et(uc,t+iλt+i) with func-
tions of the state vector Xt, in other words :
(27) Et(uc,t+i) = Φ
i(Xt,γ
i) and Et(λt+1uc,t+i) = Ψ
i(Xt, δ
i) i = S,N
where Φi and Ψi belong to a class of functions such that Φi(·,γi) and Ψi(·, δi) can approximate the
conditional expectations arbitrarily well. We will take Φi and Ψi to be polynomials of a given order
so γi and δi will be coefficients on the variables in Xt as well as their squares, cubes, cross-products
and so on, depending on the order of the approximating polynomial of Φi and Ψi that is used.19
The system (6), (10) and (11) has four equations that we hope will give a solution for the four
variables (ct, b
S
t , b
N
t , λt) given the parameterized expectations. In Section 4.3 we discuss how to set
up this system so that (ct, b
S
t , b
N
t , λt) can be conveniently solved for.
PEA then iterates to find parameter values γi,f and δi,f that satisfy the following fixed point prop-
erty: the series for
{
ct, b
S
t , b
N
t , λt
}
generated by (γi,f ,δi,f ) is such that Φi(Xt,γ
i,f ) and Ψi(Xt, δ
i,f )
are the best predictors of the objects inside the conditional expectations (27) among any other γi, δi.
4.2 The Condensed PEA
Despite the simplicity of our model the state vector is very large. For the case where the government
issues one- and ten-year bonds (i.e S = 1, N = 10) the state vector Xt has 22 elements. Allowing
the government to issue all maturities between 1 and 10 increases the length of Xt to 67, as every
maturity m adds m lags of bond quantities to the state vector. Since debt limits play a role in our
model perturbation methods are not appropriate as they cannot approximate well the solution both
near and away from the debt limits, so we strive to approximate the non-linear solution globally.
In this situation a state vector of such dimension is difficult to handle even for our relatively basic
model.
However, there are reasons to believe that, for most models, the dimensions of the state vector
can be effectively reduced. With so many state variables our numerical methodology has a tendency
towards close collinearity in the elements of Xt. Furthermore, in models with incomplete markets
both λ and b have near unit roots.20 This means that the regressions used to compute parameters γ
and δ are nearly undefined and in plain PEA this often leads the algorithm to either circle indefinitely
or even diverge.
However this multicollinearity is in a way encouraging: it suggests that in the optimal solution
many elements of Xt influence the conditional expectation only slightly. Therefore it is likely that
19For the sake of clarity we represent the approximating functions using ordinary polynomials though it should
be noted that the technique may be applied to orthogonal polynomials (such as Chebyshev, Hermite and Legendre
families). We utilize polynomials that are additively separable in the state variables as this allows us to calculate the
coefficients with linear methods.
20See Aiyagari et al. (2002).
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the “relevant” information in Xt can be condensed in a few state variables to obtain a good approx-
imation. After all, we know some models where this is exactly right. For example, under complete
markets all past bond issuances can be ”condensed” in total wealth, which is the only relevant state
variable. In our case we may expect this to be approximately true.
Furthermore, in PEA we only need that the variable ”condensing” Xt have good properties
in predicting the objects inside the conditional expectation of the equilibrium conditions. In the
solutions we compute each of the elements of Xt determine the simulation through their role in the
budget constraints and other optimality conditions - only the role of Xt in the conditional expectations
is condensed.
Intuitively, the dimensionality of Xt can be reduced for two reasons: first because many elements
of Xt may be perfectly correlated with the rest of the states, and second because they may be (nearly)
irrelevant in predicting the objects they should predict along the optimal solution.21
More specifically, in solving the buyback model we approximate the expectation
(28) Et(uc,t+i)
which appears in the implementability constraint (6) and the first order condition (11).22 We par-
tition Xt into two parts: a subset of n state variables {Xcoret } ⊂ {Xt} , where n is small and an
omitted subset of state variables {Xoutt } = {Xt} − {Xcoret }. Although in our later application the
approximating function Φi(·,γi) includes higher order terms in the solution we study below for the
sake of the exposition we illustrate assuming Φi(·,γi) is linear.
The idea is to first solve the model including only Xcoret as state variables and find a fixed point
γi,f,core when only Xcoret is included in Φ
i. We subsequently define the prediction error:
(29) φt+i ≡ uc,t+i − Φi(Xcoret ,γi,f,core).
If this is a good approximation then Et(uc,t+i) ' Φi(Xcoret ,γi,f,core) and the error φt+i would be
linearly unpredictable with Xoutt . In this case we would claim the solution with core variables is a
good approximation. But if Xoutt is correlated with φt+i it means that some elements of X
out
t help
predict uc,t+i above the prediction provided by X
core
t . We then find the linear combination X
out
t that
has the highest predictive power for φt+i, say X
out′
t · α, we add this linear combination (only one
more variable) to the set of state variables in Φi, solve the model again with (Xcoret ,X
out′
t ·α) as state
variables, find a new fixed point γi,f,1 with one more element, check if Xoutt can predict the new error
φt+i and possibly add new linear combinations of X
out
t . Once we find that X
out
t does not have any
linear predictive power for the prediction errors we claim that we have found a sufficient summary
of the whole state vector Xt.
We now provide a more formal definition of Condensed PEA. Given a selection for core variables
Step 1 Parameterize the expectation as
(30) Et(uc,t+i) = Φ
i(Xcoret ,γ
i,core).
21Reiter (2009) addresses a related issue in solving dynamic models with heterogeneous agents. He applies techniques
used in control theory to reduce the dimensionality of the agents’ distribution of wealth.
22Of course, the remaining conditional expectations that appear in the equilibrium conditions must be handled with
this procedure as well.
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Since we consider for now linear Φi (with a constant term) we have γi,core ∈ Rn+1. Find γi,f,core
that satisfies the usual PEA fixed point i.e where the series generated by Φi(Xcoret ,γ
i,f,core)
predicts uc,t+i better than with any other γ
i,core.
The next step orthogonalizes the information in Xoutt . This will be helpful to give good initial
conditions for the next iteration and to arrive at a well conditioned fixed point problem in Step
4.
Step 2 Using a simulation of T periods, for a large23 T , run a regression of each element of Xoutt
on the core variables. That is, letting Xoutj,t be the j−th element, we now run the regression
Xoutj,t = (1,X
core′
t ) · ωj1 + v1j,t
ω1j ∈ Rn+1 for j = 1, 2, . . . , 2N + S + 1− n and calculate the residuals
(31) Xres,1j,t = X
out
j,t − (1,Xcore′t ) · ω1j .
It is clear that Xres,1 adds the same information to Xcore as Xout does, but Xres,1 has the
advantage of being orthogonal to Xcore.
Step 3 Find the first linear combination α1 ∈ R2N+S+1−n through the following OLS regression:
(32) α1 = arg min
α
T∑
t=1
(
uc,t+i − (1,Xcore′t ) · γi,f,core −Xres,1′t ·α
)2
.
If introducing Xres,1′t · α does not reduce significantly the sum of squared residuals relative
to the solution with only Xcore we claim the core solution is sufficiently accurate and stop.
Otherwise there is evidence that more state variables should be added to the solution and we
go to the next step.
Step 4 Apply PEA adding Xres,1′t ·α1 as a state variable, i.e. parameterizing the conditional expec-
tation as
Et(uc,t+i) = Φ
i(Xcoret ,X
res,1′
t α
1,γi)
where γi ∈ Rn+2. Find a fixed point γi,f for this parameterized expectation. Because γi,f,core
is a fixed point and since Xcoret and X
res,1
t are orthogonal and the linear combination α
1 has
high predictive power, in order to find the fixed point γi,f it makes sense to start iterations
with the initial conditions
γi
(n+2)×1
=
(
γi,f,core
1
)
.
Go to Step 2 with
(
Xcoret ,X
res,1′
t α
1
)
in the place of Xcoret , check if a new linear combination
reduces squared residuals, etc.
A couple of remarks are in order. First, note that the Condensed PEA proposed in this section
is designed to deal with a very large number of state variables. Our focus is on debt management
23This definition assumes we are interested in the steady state distribution. This step could be modified in the usual
way (i.e. running the model with many short samples) to take into account transitions. See, for example, Faraglia,
Marcet, Oikonomou and Scott (2014) for a detailed description.
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and more broadly portfolio models but the method should be useful in many other applications with
high-dimensional states including models with many sectors or heterogeneous agents. Second, note
that in the presence of many state variables the literature has often solved dynamic economic models
by adding state variables one by one in some “order” until the next variable does not materially
influence the solution. For example, if many lags are needed the typical approach is to add the first
lag, then the second lag, and so on. If at some step the solution changes very little it is claimed that
the solution is sufficiently accurate. But it is easy to find reasons why this argument may fail. For
instance, maybe the variables further down the list are more relevant, as is the case in our model
since a simple inspection of (10) suggests that the N -th lags of both bN and λ play a special role in
the solution. Also, it can be that a linear combination of the remaining variables makes a difference
but these variables do not make a difference one by one. The condensed PEA gives a chance to all
state variables to make a difference in the solution in only one step and it will pick up the relevance
of combinations of state variables (for example, capturing that under complete markets only total
wealth matters).
4.3 Forward States PEA
As we discussed above a key step in PEA relies on solving for equilibrium variables using given
functions ΨN(·, δN) and ΦN(·,γN ). In particular, off corners the system of four equations (6), (10)
and (11) should deliver a solution for the four variables (ct, b
S
t , b
N
t , λt). However, because of the
multiplicity of assets the system (6), (10) and (11) is not well determined. Note that the two Euler
equations imply
(33) λt =
ΨS(Xt, δ
S)
ΦS(Xt,γS)
and λt =
ΨN(Xt, δ
N)
ΦN(Xt,γN)
.
Since the vector Xt contains only predetermined variables, (33) gives us two equations to solve for the
variable λt, so this multiplier is overdetermined while the values for bond holdings are indeterminate.
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Note that this is not a fundamental indeterminacy in the model, it is only an indeterminacy of the
particular way PEA solves this problem. We overcome this through the following modification.
4.3.1 Solution through Forward States (FS)
Our proposal is to formulate conditional expectations as functions of current values of state vari-
ables. We accomplish this using the following two steps. First, instead of approximating (27) we
approximate
Et(uc,t+i−1) = Φi(Xt,γi) and Et(λtuc,t+i−1) = Ψi(Xt, δ
i) i = S,N ,
24Marcet and Singleton (1999) and den Haan (1995) (MSDH) already identified this problem in related models.
Applying their procedure to the current model is done as follows: replace Et(uc,t+1) by Et(uc,t+1H(ζ, b
1
t ))/H(ζ, b
1
t )
whereH is some function with fixed parameters ζ , invertible in bit, andH > 0. Then parameterize Et(uc,t+iH(ζ, b
i
t)) =
Φ
S
(Xt,γ
S) . The multiplier can be recovered with the second equation in (33) and bond holdings from H(ζ, b1t ) =
ΦS(Xt,γ
1)
ΨS(Xt,δ1)
λt . When we used this approach for the current model the algorithm diverges or circles indefinitely. We
discuss in the last footnote of this section the reason why FS may work better.
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where the only difference with the parameterization in (27) is that we have substracted -1 from
the subindeces of the variables inside the conditional expectation. Second, we invoke the law of
iterated expectations to write, for example, Et(uc,t+i) = Et(Φ
i(Xt+1,γ
i)) in order to approximate
(11). Similarly, Et(Ψ
i(Xt+1, δ
i)) approximates Et(uc,t+iλt+1). Substituting these expressions in the
system of first order conditions we get that (33) becomes
λt =
Et(Ψ
i(Xt+1, δ
i))
Et(Φi(Xt+1,γi))
for i = S,N(34) ∑
i∈{S,N}
bitβ
iEt(Φ
i(Xt+1,γ
i)) =
∑
i∈{S,N}
bit−1β
i−1Φi(Xt,γi) + gtuc,t − (uc,t − vx,t)(gt + ct)(35)
Now current b’s do enter the right side of (34), therefore these equations plus (10) determine(
ct, b
S
t , b
N
t , λt
)
given Ψi(·, δi) and Φi(·,γi) and the first order conditions with respect to bit hold.25 In
the Online Appendix B we describe further the details of applying this procedure in the model at
hand.26
5 Optimal Debt Management
Having outlined our solution method we now turn to examine numerically optimal DM under four
different market scenarios: full buyback and no buyback, each combined with loose lending con-
straints (i.e. large |M i| ,
∣∣M i∣∣) and no-lending (M i = 0). The no lending constraint M i = 0 follows a
number of DM papers (e.g Lustig et al. (2008) and Nosbusch (2008)) and is clearly consistent with
the stylised facts of Section 2. A number of candidate possible explanations spring to mind such as
the uninsurable risk involved in holding private assets and controversies over exactly which private
assets the government should buy.27
To calibrate all four models we follow Marcet and Scott (2009). We choose β=0.95, set utility
u(ct) + v(xt) = log(ct) + η
(xt)1−γ
1−γ and use a time endowment T=100. We choose a value of γ = 2 and
target a value for η so that on average the household’s leisure is 30% of the time endowment; with
taxes that balance the budget at the deterministic steady state, this gives η =12.857. Finally, our
25In particular we compute
EtΦ
i(Xt+1,γ
i) =
∫
Φi(g′, λt, . . . , bNt−N+1,γ
i)fg′|gtdg
′
analytically, we give the formula in the Online Appendix B.1. This expression shows how this term depends on
bNt , b
S
t in addition to predetermined variables.
26In a previous footnote we mentioned that the approach of MSDH did not work in practice for the current paper,
while FS works in the very many versions of the model that we have tried. We do not have a theorem that FS
works better than MSDH in general, but we can offer two reasons why it may behave better: first the function H in
MSDH is arbitrary, it has to be such that its realized value correlates significantly with marginal utility, it has to be
well-approximated by PEA. It is difficult to know beforehand which function H has such properties. FS avoids such
an arbitrary choice. Second, our approximation to Et(uc,t+i) under FS depends at most on lags t − N + 1, it does
not depend on lags dated t−N. Obviously, the true solution also has this property. We contend that in this way FS
imposes more closely features of the true solution in the numerical approximation and this lends more stability to the
algorithm.
27Of course the Fed and Treasury have purchased private assets during the financial crisis. This seems not to do
with debt management but more tackling financial market disruptions that we, as does the rest of the literature,
abstract from. Introducing self-fulfilling debt crises, as in Conesa and Kehoe (2017), in our model would justify that
in periods when a debt crisis may occur the government purchases its own bonds while in other periods bond issuance
is governed by the mechanisms we describe in the paper.
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parameterization of the stochastic process for spending shocks is :
(36) gt = (1− ρg)g + ρg gt−1 + t.
We set ρg=0.95, σ
2
ε =1.44. We further truncate the value of spending so that it always lies within
an interval of 15% to 35% of steady state GDP. g is chosen so that the ratio of spending to output
is 25% in the deterministic steady state.
We consider two maturities S = 1 and N = 10, in other words we focus on the case where the
government issues a one and a ten year bond. As discussed previously, the bounds M i and M i are in
units of steady state market value of debt and we set the upper bounds M i equal to 100% of GDP.
This implies that the government can issue debt equal to a maximum of 200% GDP if both bonds
are at their upper bound.28
In Table 4 we show the key moments to summarize Facts 1 to 4, namely, the serial correlation,
standard deviation and the mean of the share of short bonds over total debt (denoted St) and the
correlation of the market value of short debt with long debt normalized by output. We show results
for each of the four cases considered and for comparison purposes we also show U.S data in the first
line.
5.1 Buyback
Consider first the case of buyback with lending i.e. loose borrowing constraints. We summarize the
output of this model in Figure 6 and the second row of Table 4. In Figure 6 we show a simulated part
of the optimal portfolio plotting the market value of short and long bonds for a typical realization
of the shocks in gt.
29
[ Figure 6 About Here ]
[ Table 4 About Here ]
The simulations show clearly that several of the predictions for DM of the complete market models
of ABN carry over to the case of incomplete markets. In periods when long bonds are away from the
upper bound the government ”issues long and saves short”, so that on average the market value of
short bonds in the sample equals -22.9 and the value of long debt is 45.8.
As is standard under incomplete markets, total debt varies through time as it performs the role
of a buffer smoothing out shocks.30 This causes total debt to have very high serial correlation and
28In our simulations the government never hits this upper bound for total debt. In our simulations the overall debt
level is rarely as high as 120-130% of GDP. Under buyback and when lending is permitted, long term bonds may hit
their upper bound constraint and short bonds their lower bound.
29The moments displayed in Table 4 are constructed from simulating the model 1000 times over 60 years. For each
sample we feed to the model the initial conditions for the debt to GDP ratio and the share of short maturity debt we
find in the data (see Online Appendix B.2 for further details). The sample shown in Figure 6 starts from zero total
debt to make it comparable to the benchmark of ABN. We show 350 periods to make the figure readable.
30See for example Aiyagari et al (2002). When markets are incomplete the government in the long run accumulates
savings for precautionary reasons, so that it can fund future adverse shocks without having to raise taxes. Aiyagari et
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a positive comovement with the primary deficit. Marcet and Scott (2009) emphasised that the
data shows clearly this behavior, making incomplete markets much more empirically plausible than
complete markets. All the models considered in this paper confirm this finding and in the interest
of space we do not discuss this empirical implication any further.
In contrast to the complete markets case the optimal portfolio is time varying,31 as is clear from
Figure 6 and from the large variance of the share of short bonds (see Table 4). This is due to total
debt varying over time and the decision of which bond to issue depending on the level of total debt.
Perhaps more surprising is the fact that, as shown in Figure 6, there are many periods where
bond positions bNt and b
S
t move in opposite directions. One may have expected a positive correlation
because, as explained in Section 3.4.1, the hedging properties of the optimal portfolio are created by
the difference between the amounts of long- and short-term debt. To the extent that the volatility
of government spending is the same in high- or low- debt periods we would expect the difference
between short and long term debt to not change much over time, implying a positive correlation of
both bond maturities.
The intuition in the last paragraph certainly works for partial equilibrium models, when the
volatility of the deficit and interest rates is exogenous to the total debt. But in our model higher
debt means higher taxes which alters equilibrium allocations for each g and, therefore, it alters
interest rates. The variability of deficits and interest rates change in different ways if taxes go up
causing the difference between long and short bonds to vary over time.
More precisely, consider the complete market model of Section 3.4.1. The numerator and the
denominator that determine BBBN in (18) will change in different proportions in response to a higher
τ depending on the wage elasticity of leisure. It turns out that for the calibrated model optimal
long bonds BBBN increase more than proportionally across economies with different initial debt b
g
−1.
Formally
∂BBBN
∂bg−1
> 1. Now, if
∂BBBN
∂bg−1
> 1 it must be the case that short bonds decrease with initial debt
in order for the budget constraint to hold, therefore
∂BBB1
∂bg−1
< 0. Putting all this together we see that,
given our calibration, across complete market economies with different initial debt, BBB1 and B
BB
N
move in opposite directions.32 We describe this issue more carefully in Appendix B.
To the extent that the government tries to replicate complete markets allocations and total debt
fluctuates over time we expect bNt to increase, and b
S
t to decrease with higher total debt, providing
a force for a negative correlation of bNt and b
S
t .
In our simulations of Figure 6 we see that in periods when bond limits are loose (and therefore the
government has more freedom to behave close to complete markets) bNt , b
S
t tend to move in oppposite
directions as described in the previous paragraph. On the other hand, in periods when bond limits
are tight there is no room to implement these portfolios and bNt , b
S
t tend to move in the same direction.
al (2002) show one example where it can be proved analytically that government savings go to a very large number,
so that the government can implement the first best in the long run. It is a common feature of optimal dynamic
contracts that if the planner can implement the first best in the long run a martingale convergence theorem leads the
economy to this first best as time goes by. Albanesi and Armenter (2012) give a set of sufficient conditions for this to
arise. In our model the government cannot implement the first best even in the long run because of the lower bound
on debt, but savings tend to be large amount, the average market value of total debt to GDP ratio in the sample that
we use to solve the model is roughly -50 percent.
31In ABN the value of the shares of short bonds are not exactly constant but their variance is near zero since the
position is constant and the price has very high serial correlation.
32A similar phenomenon was found in the economy with endogenous capital and complete markets of Faraglia,
Marcet and Scott (2010). Figure 2 in that paper shows that a negative correlation of long and short position emerges.
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These two forces turn out to cancel out in the long run and this is why we see a correlation of bNt , b
S
t
over time close to zero as reported in Table 4.
In summary: the general insights of standard Ramsey models carry over to incomplete markets
to some extent - on average bNt > b
S
t , debt positions are large, away from debt limits b
N
t , b
S
t have a
negative correlation but there is now an additional variability of total debt and DM positions over
time due to behavior around the bounds.
Now consider no-lending, where M i = 0. A typical simulation is displayed in Figure 7 based on
the same sequence of spending shocks as Figure 6. The solid line represents one year debt and the
dashed line ten year debt.
[ Figure 7 About Here ]
Figure 7 shows that it is still optimal to issue mostly long term debt under buyback and no
lending. Short bonds are often close to their lower limit and indeed in some periods we have b1t = 0.
The third row of Table 4 shows the key moments for the model. The average share of short bonds
is at a low 12%, with b1t = 0 in 13.1% of the periods and it is less than 10% more than half of the
time. Recall that in the data the lowest share short bonds was 24%.
The intuition for this result is that since it is now impossible to build the ”issue long, save short”
portfolio that provides fiscal insurance, the government gets as close as possible to this portfolio by
setting short bonds close to zero.33 For high levels of total debt we see the government issuing both
short and long debt so that overall there is a weakly positive correlation between them. There is
no longer scope for increasing long bonds by more than one-to-one when debt increases. This is
because there is no possibility of compensating this higher long bond issuance with negative short
bond issuance. Therefore the force for a negative correlation of long and short bonds is suppressed
and the correlation is now positive.
Our conclusion is that in this case fiscal insurance concerns still dominate, leading the govern-
ment to prefer to issue mostly long bonds. The average share of short debt is relatively minor and
concentrated in times when total government debt is high. The selected DM moments of this model
in the third line of Table 4 are still far from the data.
5.2 No Buyback
As we mentioned in the introduction our paper has both normative and positive aspects: we sys-
tematically compare our models with the data and to the extent that large differences arise one may
conclude that actual policy should change. As the optimal buyback no-lending policy is at odds with
the data (i.e the first and third lines in Table 4 are very different) several normative recommendations
emerge: governments should issue a much larger proportion of long bonds to achieve fiscal insurance;
short bonds should be issued only when debt is already very large; the government should repurchase
previously issued bonds.
But the buyback assumption was introduced in the literature for convenience not because it
describes actual bond markets. Motivated by empirical observations of Facts 5-7 it is of interest
to introduce no buyback in the model. If we should find that introducing no buyback helps match
33This intuition was already mentioned in Nosbusch (2008) and Lustig et al. (2008).
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the first line of Table 4 and if we can justify that no buyback is closer to the data then the above
normative recommendations would be mute.
We now describe the optimal portfolio under no buyback. Later we discuss why no buyback may
arise. Notice that in this model at any point in time there are bonds of all maturities between 1 and
10 outstanding in the market, so that ten-year bonds issued nine years ago are now short bonds. We
take this properly into account in the statistics we compute below.
The typical realizations with loose debt limits are displayed in Figure 8 and with no lending in
Figure 9. Under lending the most striking difference with buyback is the strong positive correlation
between issued short and long term debt. The usual incomplete market result that governments
should accumulate assets still holds in this case. However, under no buyback the government funds
a larger deficit by issuing both short and long run debt at the same time. As explained in Section
3.4.4, the reason is that under no buyback issuing only long term debt is less effective at providing
fiscal insurance and adds volatility in taxes through N cycles. The implication is that short bonds
are a valuable asset in mitigating these cycles. The result is a much stronger co-movement of short
and long bond issuance.
[ Figures 8 and 9 About Here ]
When we add to no buyback the No-Lending constraint the tendency for short and long debt to
co-move is strengthened further but now short term debt plays a much more substantial role (with
an average portfolio share of 48%). Under no lending the share of short term debt is also less volatile
and more persistent than under buyback.
The fourth and fifth rows in Table 4 confirm that under no buyback the moments of the data
are matched quite closely. Since we are engaged in comparing statistics in the model and the data
it is of interest to make this comparison systematic by using standard inference. Table 5 shows
t-statistics for the null hypothesis that the various statistics reported from our simulations are equal
to those for US data in our sample period. The t-statistics are simply the difference of the model
and data moment divided by the standard deviation of the moment.34 The standard deviations of
the moments are shown in the first row of Table 5 . The t-statistics are shown in rows 2 to 7 of the
Table.
Our aim in calculating t-statistics is not to see if our model can explain the data. Our modelling of
both the economy and the bond market are extremely simple and easy to falsify. Instead the purpose
of Table 5 is to provide some form of statistical gauge to our previous observation that buyback is very
far from the data while no buyback is much closer. Table 5 suggests that once allowance is made for
no buyback and no lending the discrepancy between Ramsey recommendations and observed practice
is very small, in fact the government should issue more short term debt. Therefore, if no buyback
is an optimal strategy for debt managers then the policy recommendations arising from buyback
(namely, as we mentioned earlier, to issue much more long bonds, to repurchase often previously
issued bonds) are, indeed, mute.
34We estimate the standard deviation of each moment considered in Table 4 from the data. For this purpose we
use the fact that, for a mean zero stationary and ergodic process xt we have
∑T xt√
T
→ N(0, Sw) in distribution. We
estimate Sw =
∑
j=−∞,∞E(xtxt−j) using the Newey-West statistic. The asymptotic standard deviation of functions
of moments (such as correlations) are found with the delta method.
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5.2.1 In-sample model fit
An approach that is often used to visualize the goodness of fit of a dynamic model is to check if
a variable determined by the model compares well with the data. For this purpose one plugs in
the observed values for the state variables into the model’s law of motion and then compares the
resulting value of the endogenous variable with the data. In our case we would like to compare the
short share St determined by the model with the data. For this purpose we should solve out the
short bond issuance using the law of motion
St = S(Xt)
where S(·) is the time-invariant policy function determining the share implied by the model solution.
One difficulty in our case is that Xt contains non observables, namely, the lagged λ’s. Therefore we
replace S(·) by an approximate law of motion that is a function only of observables. These observables
are selected with an eye to using variables that are stationary, so that their data counterpart is a
reasonable value to be plugged into the model’s law of motion. For this purpose we use model
simulations to regress St on its first and second lags, two lags of the market value of total debt
over GDP, the current value and first lag of the spending over GDP series. We also include higher
order terms of these variables to produce a ’good fit’ to the model’s policy function. This was
done separately for the buyback and no buyback models, since the DM policies differ across these
two models. The regression is performed with all the periods and realizations used in constructing
the moments reported in Table 4.35 Second, we feed the ’data state variables’ to each model’s
approximate policy function to obtain the graphs shown in Figure 10. The data line for St is the
same as in Figure 1, but because of the inclusion of two lags in the regressions the sample starts in
1957 in Figure 10.
As can be seen the fit of the model under no buyback tracks the short share quite well both in
terms of its level as well as its movements in response to government spending shocks.36 Given the
extreme simplicity of the model economy the fit of the no buyback model is surprisingly good. The
fit of the model under buyback is much poorer. The correlation between the series produced by the
buyback model and the data series equals 0.4. The analogous correlation between the no buyback
model and the data equals 0.88.
[ Figures 10 About Here ]
6 Optimal Bond Repurchases and Transaction Costs
The previous sections considered optimal DM when the government was constrained to either repur-
chasing as much as possible (buyback) or not to repurchase at all (no-buyback). Both are extreme
restrictions on government behaviour. As we have shown optimal DM differs substantially between
35To capture better the part of the state space that is active for the CRSP sample, we only use in the regression
observations with market value to GDP ratio between 20 percent and 70 percent.
36The fit is not perfect - there is an obvious ’lag’ in the data relative to the model. We attribute this to the fact that
spending does not respond contemporaneously to higher output in the US (see for example the considerable literature
on identifying spending shocks in SVARs).
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them and no buyback fares much better in reproducing observed stylized DM observations. The
question then is: which set of assumptions is most plausible for the study of DM?
Viewed from the perspective of the buyback model cancelling the access to r/r ’s may appear self-
limiting. Indeed, for the calibrated model of the previous section the consumer utility is slightly higher
in the optimal buyback allocation than no-buyback, so one could claim that the no-buyback model
is in fact incompatible with an optimizing government.37 Furthermore, although rare, some bond
repurchases are observed in the data, as discussed after Fact 6 in Section 2. Perhaps governments
should engage in the repurchases more often, as they do in the buyback model of Section 5.1.
However, as discussed at the end of Section 2, many features of actual government bond markets
make r/r costly. The standard debt management literature assumes governments can issue and
repurchase debt at the same market price but the existence of transaction costs means that in
practice this is not the case. So an alternative view is that no buyback as in section 5.2 is the
relevant exercise, as transaction costs make the huge r/r in the buyback model too costly.
A way to settle this issue is to model transaction costs as in the data and to allow the government
to choose optimally how much to repurchase. We have motivated the upper bound M as an extreme
transaction costs function, where bond issues above M become suddenly very costly. In that setup the
government never actually pays a transaction cost. However the empirical literature on transaction
costs of bond issuances suggests a smoother transaction cost function than these bond limits imply
and so we can imagine the government choosing to pay transaction costs sometimes as part of optimal
DM.”
A priori it is not obvious what optimal DM may look like assuming smaller and smoother trans-
action costs. In practice such costs are very small expressed as a percentage of the total bond issue.
This suggests transaction costs would have little effect however it is also the case that the welfare
gains from r/r are also quite small (see previous footnote) so that even small transaction costs might
change DM substantially. The intuition for why the gains from r/r are small gain can be found from
Aiyagari et al (2002, page 1248) who report small gains between the full complete market outcome
and the optimal incomplete market policy under buyback. Given we have shown that under no
buyback the government can use short bonds to get close to the complete market outcome as well
then we are comparing two incomplete market economies which are close to complete markets and
so we should expect relatively small welfare differences between them.
Of course depending on the level of transaction costs the optimal behaviour may be an inter-
mediate position with the government sometimes buying back some of the debt. In that case, the
observed pattern that repurchases occur in periods of total debt reduction (see discussion after Fact
6) provide another challenge for the model.
It is to these issues that we now turn. In this section we perform three exercises. The first is to
use various studies of the US government debt market to calibrate a reduced form function capturing
the various transaction costs discussed at the end of Section 2. The second is to use these estimates
of transaction costs and perform a shadow cost analysis of the two extreme cases of full buyback and
37More precisely, the consumption-equivalent increase in utility ω satisfying
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u
(
(1 + ω) cNBBt
)
+ v
(
xNBBt
)]
= E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u
(
cBBt
)
+ v
(
xBBt
)]
turns out to be ω = 0.00416 .
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no-buyback and see whether the fiscal insurance benefits of buyback outweigh the transaction costs
involved in r/r. Finally we move away from the two extreme cases and allow for the government to
choose each period how much debt to repurchase or leave outstanding.
6.1 Calibrating Transaction Costs
At the end of Section 2 we outlined a number of factors that will lead r/r operations to be costly.
These factors will be reflected in bid-ask spreads and auction effects, whereby the more of a specific
bond the government wishes to issue or purchase the more the price shifts against the government.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to introduce explicit microfoundations for these effects. Instead
our interest is in establishing whether concern over these costs should substantially influence optimal
policy. To do so we extend our model to allow for a reduced form transactions cost function. We
denote issuance costs by T i(bit) and the cost of repurchasing a bond that was issued at t − 1 by
T R(Rt). Assuming these costs are ad valorem e.g the bid-ask spreads are a percentage of price, gives
total transaction costs at t as
T ott =
∑
i∈{S,N}
pit b
i
t T i(bit) + pN−1t Rt T R(Rt).
Based on our discussion in Section 2 we specify the following functions for transaction costs:
T i(bit) = αi0+αi1bit for i = S,N and T R(Rt) = αR0 +αR1 Rt.38 The bid-ask spread margin is independent
of the scale of purchases and so will be reflected in the intercept terms α0 whilst the auction effects
pin down the slope effects. The fact that the costs are linear in issuance/repurchases means that the
term T i(bit) which appears in the total costs is linear quadratic. Assuming a linear quadratic function
is a standard specification in the literature on transaction costs and captures the notion, common in
our conversations with debt managers, that price pressures increase the larger the transaction.39
As usual in the transaction cost literature we assume that these costs are in terms of hours worked
so that feasibility now requires40
ct + gt + T ott = T − xt
Amihud and Mendelson (1991) calculate that bid aks spreads and brokerage fees amount to
0.0381 percent of the price for bonds and 0.0099 percent for Treasury bills. This gives us estimates
of α10 = 0.000099 and α
N
0 = α
R
0 = 0.000381 (given the face value of a bond is 1 in our model and
bid-ask spreads are symmetrical on buyers and sellers). To calibrate the slope terms α1 we use the
estimates of Lou, Yan and Zhang (2013) such that yields are affected by 3 basis points on average
due to auction effects on issuance/repurchases.41 Their estimate is common across all maturities.
The fact the impact is calibrated in terms of yearly yields and the costs T above are paid only
at issuance means that we need to translate the 3 bps estimate into issuance costs T . The effect
38If bit would be allowed to be negative this function would present a kink at b
i
t = 0, giving rise to non-smooth
solutions that would be hard to compute. Since we impose bit ≥ 0 in this subsection there is no kink, solutions are
smooth, and all costs considered are indeed positive if we take T i ≥ 0.
39Support for this is also to be found in Breedon and Turner (2016) Table A2.1.
40Not all transaction costs require resources to be deducted from the resource constraint. Our findings in this section
remain if no such deduction is made.
41Lou et al actually give a range of 2-3 bps. These estimates are broadly similar to Breedon and Turner (2016)
Table 2 and substantially less than many estimates of the impact of QE on yields.
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of issuance/purchase is larger on longer maturity bonds (the impact on bond prices is proportional
to the impact on yield multiplied by the duration of the bond). This calibration means that the
steady state yields of bonds, after taking into account auction effects, is 1/β+ 0.0003− 1, i.e auction
effects increase the cost of issuing bonds across all maturities by 3 basis points on average. The
annualized yield plus auction costs implied by the above transaction cost function is
(
1
pi(1−αi1bi)
)1/i
−1,
where pi and bi are averages. Equating these expressions and rearranging gives an estimate of
αi1b
i = 1 − (1 + 0.0003β)−i. For i = 10, 9,1 this gives average auction costs (αi1bi) of 0.0028, 0.0026
and 0.000284 respectively. To calibrate the slope terms we need to divide these average auction
effects through by the average issuance in our simulations. Since the no-buyback model of Section
5.2 matches the data reasonably well we use average issuances in that model to arrive at the following
estimates for the slope coefficients : α11 = 0.000021, α
10
1 = 0.001 and α
R
1 = 0.000926.
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6.2 A Shadow Cost Calculation
As mentioned before, for the calibration used here, the utility of the optimal allocation is indeed
higher under buyback. But since the buyback strategy involves many more purchases and sales it
is not clear if the benefit of fiscal insurance under buyback will dominate if transaction costs exist.
We now make an approximate ”shadow” calculation of the loss in utility due to transaction costs.43
This calculation has the virtue of being independent of the precise way that we model repurchases.
Since the transaction costs are small and they indicate a larger government expenditure, the lagrange
multipliers of each solution translate transaction costs into an approximate utility loss.
Let superindex BB denote the solution with buyback of Section 5.1 and NBB the solution under
no buyback in Section 5.2.
A transaction cost plays the same role as higher gt both in the government budget constraint and
in the utility term βtv(T − ct − gt). The total marginal utility loss of higher gt in t is
λ˜BBt + β
tv′(T − cBBt − gBBt − T otBBt )
where λ˜BBt is the ”plain” lagrange multiplier of the government budget constraint. Since we have
normalized the plain lagrange multipliers in the usual way,44 we have that the lagrange multipliers
of Section 5.1 are given by
λ˜BBt = β
tλBBt u
BB
c,t .
42We calibrate repurchases assuming that the auction effects are symmetric in buying and selling. We therefore use
estimates for i = 9 to calibrate the repurchase auction effects one year after a ten year bond has been issued. Point
estimates in Breedon and Turner (2016) suggest that repurchase auction effects may actually be larger than issuance
effects. However given the importance of no buyback in our model we make the more conservative assumption that
the two effects are symmetric and our results are clearly robust to attributing higher effects to repurchases.
43We thank Dimitri Vayanos for suggesting this calculation.
44The ”plain” lagrange multiplier would be the one that would come out of a standard Lagrangean, namely
L = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(u(ct) + v(T − ct − gt)) +
E0
∞∑
t=0
λ˜t
 ∑
i∈{S,N}
bitEt
(
βi
uc,t+i
uc,t
)
−
∑
i∈{S,N}
bit−1Et
(
βi−1
uc,t+i−1
uc,t
)
+ gt − (1− vx,t
uc,t
)(gt + ct)
 .
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Therefore the total shadow transaction costs of buyback, in term of utility, is
T otalBB = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
λBBt u
BB
c,t + v
BB
x,t
) T otBBt .
The total costs of the no buyback strategy T otalNBB are found similarly, using the lagrange multi-
pliers of the no-buyback solution and Rt = 0.
Denoting utility of the optimal allocation under each environment as U i = E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t [u(cit) + v(x
i
t)]
for i = BB,NBB, we define total utility net of transaction costs for each policy as U i−T otali. Then,
we find the scaling factor χ such that if the transaction cost functions would be χ
(T R, T S, T N) the
government is indifferent between the two strategies. This factor is given by
χ =
UBB − UNBB
T otalBB − T otalNBB .
If it turns out that χ < 1 it means that, given the approximate utility calculation, the transaction
costs of buyback outweigh their benefit.45
We find χ = 0.07. In other words, once we take into account transaction costs the buyback
strategy is more costly than no buyback. This would be so even if transaction costs would only be
one tenth lower.
6.3 A Model of Optimal Bond Repurchases
The previous shadow cost calculation supports our intuition that if one considers the two extremes,
buyback or no-buyback, the former involves such large bond transaction that it ceases to be optimal
once transaction costs are taken into account. That result is largely robust to our transaction cost
calibration, as it would still hold if transaction costs were one tenth of the calibrated value.
We now examine the same issue by studying a model where repurchases of any amount are allowed
and the optimal level of repurchases is decided each period. The budget constraint of the government
is as follows∑
i∈{S,N}
pitb
i
t(1− T i(bit)) = bSt−S + bNt−N −Rt−N+1 + pN−1t Rt(1 + T R(Rt)) + gt − τt(T − xt)(37)
0 ≤ bit ≤
M i∑i
j=1 β
j
, 0 ≤ Rt ≤ bNt−1(38)
There are three differences relative to the models of Sections 3.2 and 3.3: i) we introduce transac-
tion costs T i, ii) repurchases Rt appear as a cost in period t and iii) repurchases Rt−N+1 appear as
an income at t−N , the amount of long bonds that mature at t is now (bNt−N −Rt−N+1). The buyback
model of section 3.2 imposes Rt = b
N
t−1 , the no-buyback model of Section 3.3 imposes Rt = 0 whilst
the current model allows any value in between.
We assume only the government pays all transaction costs, hence the consumer/investor budget
constraint is unchanged relative to previous sections. This simplifies the model. Since we look at
optimal policy the government will take into account the presence of all transaction costs anyway,
45Details on the approximations can be found in the Online Appendix B.4.
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hence results should be very similar even if consumers pay part of the transaction costs. Another
assumption in the above model is that we only consider repurchases of long bonds issued in the pre-
vious period. This keeps as close as possible to the standard optimal DM literature and considerably
simplifies the analysis.46
The Lagrangean is straightforward to write and is shown in Online Appendix A.3. Endogenous
repurchases complicate the simulations in various dimensions: obviously now we have an additional
decision variable Rt. Furthermore, since Rt−N+1 enters the budget constraint at t it might seem that
we now have to add N − 1 lags of R to the state variables Xt so we end up with S + 3N state
variables. However, after some manipulations one can show that a sufficient set of state variables is
Xt =
[
gt, (Bt−i, Bλt−i)
S
i=1 ,
(
Bnett−i, Bλ
net
t−i
)N−S+1
i=1
, λt−N , bNt−N
]
where
Bnett ≡ bNt−1 −Rt
Bt ≡ bSt +Bnett−N+1+S
Bλnett ≡ λt−1(1− T N)bNt−1 + λt(1 + T R)Rt
Bλt ≡ λt(1− T S)bSt +Bλnett−N+1+S
see Online Appendix A.3. Therefore we have ”only” 1 + 2N state variables.
6.3.1 Simulation Results
Solving our model with transaction costs calibrated as above but allowing the government to choose
how much debt to repurchase each period effectively generates the no buy back situation. The
government chooses to repurchase only very rarely and even then only during periods of strong debt
reduction due to large government surpluses - similar to the US in the 1920s and 2000-1. In Figure
11 we plot the ratio of the market value of debt to GDP, and the absolute level of repurchases using
the same sample for g as in Figures 6 to 9. Notice that repurchases are a tiny fraction of GDP and
that indeed the government repurchases debt only in periods where debt falls sharply. The moments
are as reported in the final row of Table 4 and they match closely the analogous objects under no
buyback and no lending 47 and those of the US data very well. The t-statistics reported in Table 5
confirm that the model is close to the data.
[ Figure 11 About Here ]
This confirms the main point of the paper, namely, that once we take into account small transac-
tion costs resembling those found in the data a portfolio with a substantial share of short bonds and
46Since we will find that buyback of any amount is very rare there will be bonds outstanding of many maturities
in this model. Hence we could entertain a model where bonds of any maturity could be repurchased. This would
complicate the analysis as there would be N − 2 more decision variables. By considering only immediate repurchases
we are maximizing the possible fiscal insurance benefits of long bonds, since the price of one-year-old long bonds is
the one that provides the largest amount of fiscal insurance as it is the longest bond outstanding.
47For brevity we do not show the portfolio of long and short bonds in a separate figure. However, as the results in
Table 4 show the behavior of the portfolio in the optimal repurchase model is very close to the no buyback model, e.g.
Figure 9
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no repurchases achieves higher utility than the portfolios under buyback that resemble the recom-
mendations arising from effectively complete market models. Therefore the basic Facts 1-7 described
in Section 2 can be matched by a model where debt management is decided optimally. More crit-
ically allowing for transaction costs means no buyback is a preferred strategy and the assumption
that optimal DM requires a reliance on long bonds is no longer accurate with short bonds playing a
significant smoothing role.
7 Robustness and Accuracy
In this section we explore the robustness of our main results to the introduction of various relevant
features. First of all, as US government bonds tend to pay a fixed semi-annual coupon we introduce
coupons in the model to see if this alters our findings. Second, we introduce a third bond in the
analysis enabling us to talk about short, medium and long issuance. Third, given that callable bonds
have been used in the sample period we study a model consistent with Fact 7 where bonds are
recalled before, but close to, maturity. Finally we explore the accuracy of our solutions.
7.1 Coupons
Although ignored in most academic papers, it is a fact that individual long term bonds in the US
pay constant semi-annual coupons. The effect of coupons on DM is non-trivial for two reasons.
Firstly, because coupons add another element of flexibility in bond payments opening up another
channel with which to complete the markets. Secondly, the existence of coupons means that a bond’s
duration (the measure of how long it takes to recoup the price paid for a bond in terms of its cash
flow) is distinct from its maturity. This distinction doesn’t exist for the zero coupon bonds but as
we have established in the presence of no buyback the duration of bonds matters for DM. Therefore
the effects of coupons are non-trivial. Let us discuss the two issues we have raised.
Completing Markets with Coupons
We show that if coupons are fixed at the time of issuance and kept constant for the duration of
the bond markets can not be completed. This occurs even if the fixed coupons are contingent on the
information at issuance. Markets can be effectively completed only if the government promises to
pay coupons contingent on future shocks complete the markets.
The outline of the argument is as follows. Consider the process for g and the notation in section
3.4. Assume the government could issue consol bonds b∞t in period t that paid coupons κ
j
t in period
t+j contingent on the realisation of gt+j for all periods t+j, all j > 0. As in sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2,
in order to complete the markets the following analog of (17) should hold for these consol bonds48
(39)
t+1∑
j=1
b∞t−j(p
j,∞
t + κ
j
t−j) = zt
where pj,∞t is the price in the secondary market at t of a consol issued at t− j.
48To simplify things we consider the case where the government can not repurchase previously issued console bonds.
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We guess and verify that the following DM policy achieves this equality for the complete market
allocations: issue nothing after t = 0, ie. b∞t = 0 for t > 0, normalise b
∞
0 = 1; contingent coupons for
the issued bond are given by κj0 = κ
H , κL contingent on gj = g
H , gL for all j.
The values κH , κL are determined as follows. If complete markets are implemented bond prices
in the secondary market at t satisfy p0,∞t = Et
(∑∞
k=1 β
k u
′(cCMt+k )
u′(cCMt )
κkt
)
. Given that cCMt+j = c
H , cL as in
section 3.4.1 we have
p0,∞t = K
H
i κ
H +KLi κ
L if gt = g
i for i = H,L where
Kki =
∞∑
j=1
βjµk,ji
u′(ck)
u′(ci)
for k, i = H,L,
where µk,ji =Prob(gt+j = g
k | gt = gi) is given by g’s Markov chain. Combining this with (39) we
find values κH , κL have to satisfy
(40) KHi κ
H +KLi κ
L + κi = zi for i = H,L
where zH , zL are as in section 3.4. This gives two equations to determine κH , κL. Clearly (39) holds
by construction since p0,∞t + κ
t
0 = zt for all periods a.s. Therefore issuing one bond at t = 0 that
pays the contingent coupons defined by (40) effectively completes markets.
Consider now the case when coupons are restricted to be fixed for the whole life of the bond,
namely κt = κ
j
t for all j. Most bonds actually issued pay (nominally) fixed coupons. In this case
we can not effectively complete markets. To see this, notice if we implemented complete markets we
would have
pj,∞t = Dtκt−j for Dt ≡ Et
∞∑
k=1
βk
u′(cCMt+k )
u′(cCMt )
so that for (39) to hold we would need
(41) (Dt + 1)
t+1∑
j=1
b∞t−jκt−j = zt.
But since Dt and zt are both different functions of gt, and since the term
∑t+1
j=1 b
∞
t−jκt−j is not
contingent on gt, equation (41) will not hold a.s.
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Therefore, for a consol to complete the markets the government needs to issue debt with contingent
coupons. This is akin to issuing contingent Arrow securities with the added difficulty that the coupon
amounts κH , κL need to satisfy equations (40) requiring a very detailed knowledge of the economy.
Obviously, if g would have a continuum of realisations the coupons paid would need to take a
continuum of values satisfying even more complicated equations.
Fixed coupons as a mixture of long and short bonds
From now one we consider a case where long bonds issued in t pay a (possibly time dependent)
constant coupon κt from periods t+ 1 to t+N and in addition it pays the principal (normalized to
unity) at t + N . Coupons can then be thought of as a means of lessening or even overcoming the
49Notice this reasoning is analogous to the one we gave at the end of section 3.4.3 to conclude that markets are
truly incomplete with zero coupon long bonds.
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problem of no buyback that has been our focus. If the government attaches to each bond a sequence
of fixed coupon payments this makes long bonds closer to short bonds (reduces their duration) and
therefore the consequences of no buyback are less severe. In this section we examine to what extent
coupon payments overcome the N -period cycles of Section 3.4.4 and attenuation of fiscal insurance.
In other words, are coupons a way of using security design to make long bonds more attractive?
It is easy to show that the competitive equilibrium price of this bond is
qNt = κt
N∑
j=1
βjEt
(
uc,t+j
uc,t
)
+ βNEt
(
uc,t+N
uc,t
)
i.e. the price is now the sum of prices of zero coupon bonds of maturity j < N (pjt = β
jEt(
uc,t+j
uc,t
))
weighted by the coupon payments plus the value of the bond repayment. Obviously, in the steady
state (with constant coupons and consumption) the bond price becomes equal to κ
∑N
j=1 β
j + βN .
According to the CRSP data, bonds issued by the US government trade close to par when they
are issued, namely qNt ≈ 1. To choose coupons that are consistent with this observation we set
κt = κ =
1−β
β
for all t. It turns out that in this case bonds trade close to par, our simulations yield
qNt close to 1 in all periods.
7.1.1 The Ramsey Program with Coupons
We now find the optimal policy assuming that long bonds pay a yearly coupon κ and assuming no
buyback. Debt limits are:
bNt ∈
[
MN∑N
j=1 β
j + κ
∑N
j=1
∑j
i=1 β
i
,
MN∑N
j=1 β
j + κ
∑N
j=1
∑j
k=1 β
k
]
≡ [M˜N , M˜N ]
and [M˜1, M˜1] ≡ [M1β , M1β ] for short bonds.50 The planning problem and the FOC with respect to
consumption are given in the Online Appendix A.4. Off corners the first order conditions for b1t and
bNt are:
λtEt(uc,t+1) = Et(λt+1uc,t+1)(42)
λtEt(κ
N∑
j=1
βjuc,t+j + β
Nuc,t+N) = Et(κ
N∑
j=1
βjuc,t+jλt+j + β
Nuc,t+Nλt+N).(43)
Equation (43) is the analogue of equation (15) (when the debt constraints are loose). It reveals that
the multiplier follows a complicated pattern which equates it with the sum of all expected future
terms uc,t+jλt+j for j = 1, 2, . . . , N weighted by the payments that the bond promises. Intuitively a
zero-coupon N maturity bond produced a N cycle in λt, if we think of coupons as themselves zero
coupon bonds then we are adding additional smaller cycles in λt at 1,2,...,N − 1
In Faraglia et al (2016) we study the properties of the single bond coupon model analyzing the
effects of fiscal shocks. We show that the optimal policy is characterized by an important N cycle
component and the main features of optimal fiscal policy under no buyback persist, since basically
50In the US coupon payments are usually six monthly. However, since our model’s horizon is one year we model one
year debt as zero coupon.
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under coupons the bulk of interest rate payments is still concentrated every N periods. For brevity
we refer the reader to Faraglia et al. (2016) for details.
In the fifth row of Table 4 we show the simulation results of the no buyback, no lending, coupon-
paying model. The results show relatively minor changes from the zero coupon case - a small
increase in the portfolio share of short bonds, a less volatile, less persistent share and a slightly
higher correlation between short and long bond issuance. Introducing coupons to long bonds does
not alter our conclusions.
7.2 Three Bonds
A relevant robustness exercise is to consider a government that issues a third bond. In particular, we
assume that in addition to 1- and 10- year bonds now the government can issue a 5-year bond. This
also serves as a test for the ability of the algorithm to deal with larger models, as the state vector
now has five more variables and an additional decision variable.
We keep the zero-coupon assumption for comparability and we only study the no buyback case.
We do not write the model and optimality conditions as they are similar to those in Section 3.3.
As can be seen from the corresponding row in Table 4, now we find that the average share of short
debt is lower than NBB with two bonds and lower than the data. There is a similar phenomenon
with the serial correlation of St. Other statistics remain the same.
The intuition for these results is clear: the five-year bond attenuates the N−period cycles that we
have discussed. By issuing 5-year bonds the height of the spikes of taxes described in Section 3.4.4
is half of the spike with a 10-year bond, hence the government is less reluctant to issuing long bonds
and reduces issuance of 1-year bonds. This example demonstrates one feature of the model at hand:
small changes in the model may have considerable impact on E(St) hence this value is not closely
determined by the theory. But there are many features of optimal DM that are well determined and
robust in the models we have considered, namely: St is never close to zero, it is stable and short
bonds are highly correlated with long bonds. The main focus of our paper is to establish a role for
short term bonds in optimal debt management which is clearly preserved in this case.
7.3 Callable Bonds
In our section on the stylised facts of US government debt we described how in the first half of our
sample period considerable use was made of callable bonds. Just as coupons can be thought of as
shortening the life of a bond so too can a callable bond. By preannouncing a future date at which
the government can buy back a bond at par the government lessens the duration. If, as is the case in
practice, governments tend to repurchase at the first call date, then cash flow is affected and bonds
are not bought back at maturity. This raises another way in which security design may lessen the
problems with long bonds and reduce the need for short bonds. We investigate this (results in the
Online Appendix A.5) by considering the case where the government issues bonds of maturity N but
repurchases them after m years where m < N e.g we assume that governments always repurchases at
the call date. We find that our main result still holds, if callable bonds are redeemed after m years
they offer less fiscal insurance and introduce greater tax volatility at lower frequencies opening up a
positive role for issuing short term debt to support optimal tax smoothing. If governments cannot
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repurchase debt each and every period then long bonds provide additional volatility and short bonds
can help tax smoothing.
7.4 Accuracy
We have performed thorough accuracy tests of all the models for which we report numerical sim-
ulations. To check the accuracy of the solution we run Euler Equation Error (EEE) tests (see for
example Aruoba et al (2006) for an exhaustive description of the methodology). Essentially this
methodology checks that first order conditions hold with an acceptable degree of precision at many
points in the state vector. For example, in the model with buyback one needs to check that Euler
equations (11) hold approximately. To interpret the size of the error, the approximation is expressed
in terms of the change in consumption units that would be required for the Euler equation to hold
exactly.
The tests require to numerically calculate each of the conditional expectations in the Euler equa-
tions. Ours is not a routine application of this accuracy test because we have expectations involving
up to N leads, so that exact integration would be too costly. For this reason we use Monte-Carlo
integration to compute these expectations, using many simulations starting at each point considered
of the state space. Details on how we perform the test are in the Online Appendix B.3.
Since we have two Euler equations (or three in the case of the optimal repurchases model) we
check separately each of them by calculating the value of the multiplier and for consumption in period
t implied by the expectations Ξt generated by our approximation, given the portfolio b1,t, bN,t. Table
6 summarises the test for the main models presented in the paper. 51 As in Aruoba et al. (2006) we
report the absolute errors using base 10 logarithms to make our findings comparable with the rest of
the literature. A value of -3 means a 1$ mistake per 1000$, a value of -4 a mistake of $1 per $10000
and so on.
Table 6 shows that the average of the errors are between -3 and -4 and that the maximum errors
are not large. Moreover, we found that it is quite unlikely that the region of the state space where the
maximum error occurs is visited in simulations. We have calculated also the percentage of positive
and negative errors. A good approximation should deliver evenly distributed errors between the two
signs. In the Online Appendix B.3 we show that the distribution is fairly even in all the models
presented with 41% to 58% of the errors being of positive sign. These results are well within the
range accepted by other authors (e.g. Aruoba et al (2006)) suggesting that the model solutions are
accurate.
8 Conclusion
We have studied optimal debt management under incomplete markets. The literature has to date
isolated a powerful influence of fiscal insurance whereby governments can exploit the negative covari-
ance between long bond prices and fiscal shocks in order to stabilise debt and minimise tax volatility.
The implications of that channel for debt management under incomplete markets leads to a policy
51An additional table in the Online Appendix B.3 provides all the details for each model and each Euler equation
in this work.
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relying heavily on issuing long term debt. The recommendations from this canonical Ramsey ap-
proach are in stark contrast to the actual behaviour of observed US debt management. One might
infer from this literature that governments should issue more long bonds, pursue very active portfolio
management and actively repurchase previously issued long bonds.
Our approach has been to consider whether there are other market frictions that introduce addi-
tional considerations into debt management. If the implications of fiscal insurance are robust across
a range of market frictions then the existing findings in the literature increase in their relevance. If
however the implications from the standard Ramsey model are non-robust then it becomes important
to isolate the exact market frictions that need to be considered in order to better understand the
implications for actual debt management.
Once we introduce incomplete markets, non-negativity constraints on bonds issued and small
transaction costs, the picture changes considerably. Optimal policy now involves repurchasing very
rarely and a sizable and stable proportion of short bonds is key in achieving tax smoothing. Short
bonds play a more important role in supporting optimal debt management than in previous papers,
as short bonds provide a flexibility and optionality that helps reduce tax volatility in the face of
fiscal shocks. Portfolio shares should be more stable and persistent and governments should issue
positive quantities of both short and long debt in response to a shock to deficit. All of these conclu-
sions are diametrically opposite to the standard recommendations from the canonical Ramsey model
mentioned earlier, making observed US debt management look much closer to the recommendations
of optimal debt management.
These main features of optimal debt management under no buyback are very robust, they stand
the introduction of coupons, more bonds, and a callable bond. Clearly the recommendations around
optimal debt management for governments can benefit from a deeper understanding of the reasons
for market incompleteness and their practical relevance. It is of course entirely feasible that other
microfounded features of market incompleteness e.g the clientele effects, asymetric information, liq-
uidity provision, reduced rollover risk, etc. restore a preference for long bonds. Critically however
they would do so for reasons other than fiscal insurance and merely reiterate the importance under
incomplete markets of specifying the reasons for market incompleteness.
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Appendix
A Database and Construction of Figures
Data on US Treasuries was obtained from the CRSP US Treasury Database and is comprised of all
types of marketable treasury securities (bills, notes, bonds and inflation protected securities (TIPS)).
Observations are available at monthly frequency. As discussed in text to compute key moments such
as the share of short maturity debt or the ratio of issuances over total debt, we focus on data from
the years 1955-2015. We extended this sample to include observations from the 1920s 30s and 40s
when we report moments on the frequency of repurchases or the timing of buybacks of callable bonds
(e.g. Tables 2 and 3).
As discussed, not all bonds are recorded by the CRSP in the 1920s-1940s. The missing amounts
outstanding are as high as 60 percent in the mid 30s and 40 percent in the early 40s. This constrains
our empirical analysis to include observations from the 1950s onwards when all bond records on
marketable US government debt are included in our dataset. We report the properties of share of
short maturity debt over total debt in the CRSP from 1955 onwards, so that our estimates exclude
the build up of public debt during the Korean war. Our results however would not be affected if we
included the early 1950s in our sample.
Date variables of particular interest for this study include the quote date, the date of the first
coupon and the maturity date. Amounts outstanding of the bonds are usually available in the CRSP
although missing for certain observations. Gaps in amounts outstanding were filled with preceding
observations for the same bond when possible or future observations if no preceding data points
existed. Coupons are typically paid every six months from the date the bond is issued and until
maturity.
To construct the share of short term debt (e.g. in Figure 1) we stripped the coupons. The
strips, were given distinct maturity dates, face values and market values. For a ten year bond paying
coupons every six months the first coupon is counted as six month maturity debt (at the issuance
date), the second coupon as one year debt and so on. 52 Market values for the strips were imputed
using the yield-maturity data.
Our sample includes both nominal and inflation protected debt (TIPS). TIPS typically represent
long maturity claims (five, ten or thirty year debt) and therefore contribute towards reducing the
average value of the share of short term debt. The first inflation protected security in the US
government bond market was issued in 1997 (before then there was no indexed government debt).
Finally, to construct the time series of the issuances (Figure 2) we adopt the following approach.
Because our definition of short term debt in the data includes maturities which are less than one year
(one month to six months in the CRSP data) we define the total issuance in short maturity debt
as : IS,t =
Im,t
12
+ I3m,t
4
+ I6m,t
2
+ I12m,t
1
where Ixm,t denote claims of maturity x months in the data
53
and the quantities Ixm,t are sums of issuances over year t. Note that differently from the case of the
52Our approach to strip the coupons and assign an appropriate maturity to each strip is compatible with the notion
that the benefits from fiscal insurance are proportional to the amount of long term government debt outstanding. If
a long term bond is issued paying coupons every six months then this bond provides less hedging to the governments
budget than a zero coupon long term bond, as is claimed in text. When we construct the model counterparts for the
series plotted in Figure 1 we follow essentially the same approach.
53This definition includes the first coupons of long term notes and bonds.
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stocks displayed in Figure 1 the issuances share is formed by a flow variable in the numerator and a
stock variable in the denominator. This approach enables us therefore to not bias the share upwards
by counting very short term issuances (monthly debt) many times over the year.
B Response of long bonds to higher debt under Buyback
We examine whether issuance of long bonds increases more than proportionally with initial debt in
the complete market case of section 3.4.1, ie.
∂BBBN
∂bg−1
> 1. This plays a role in the intuition we give for
the behavior of DM in Figure 6, section 5.1.
Taking derivatives in the equation determining long bonds (18) we have
(44)
∂BBBN
∂bg−1
= BBBN
[
∆′z
∆z
− ∆
′p
∆p
]
∂τ
∂bg−1
where in this appendix we denote ∆z ≡ zH − zL, ∆′z ≡ ∂ ∆z
∂τ
, similarly ∆p ≡ pN−1H − pN−1L and for
all other variables. The values of z and p are evaluated at the complete markets solution.
Note that in this complete market economy ∆x gives the variability of variable x across time.
Therefore
∂BBBN
∂bg−1
depends not only on the bond level itself BBBN , but also on the tax elasticity of the
variability of the yield curve (∆′p/∆p) and of the variability of surpluses (∆′z/∆z).
It is clear that ∂τ
∂bg−1
> 0 and BBBN > 0.
54 In a partial equilibrium model we would have ∆′p = 0,
but in our general equilibrium model the variability of interest rates depends on consumption and,
therefore, it varies with income taxes so that ∆′p/∆p is not zero. We study this dependence in detail
below.
We first find
∂BBBN
∂bg−1
by calculating BBBN for different initial debt given our calibration in section
5. We fit a two-value, symmetric g process that roughly reproduces the mean, variance and serial
correlation of (36) and we use gH = 18.94, gL = 16.06, µ = Pr ob(gt+1 = g
i | gt = gi) = 0.95. Figure
12 shows
∂BBBN
∂bg−1
in the vertical axis and initial debt bg−1 in the horizontal axis. Clearly
∂BBBN
∂bg−1
> 1 for
bg−1 within the debt limits. This explains why in some periods b
N
t and b
1
t move in opposite directions
in the lending model of section 5.1.
[Figure 12 About Here]
Uncertain signs of the derivative
After showing numerically that
∂BBBN
∂bg−1
> 1 for a specific calibration we now explore the robustness
of this property. We find that this is not a robust feature of the model: the various elasticities of
consumption can combine to produce different
∂BBBN
∂bg−1
, one can even find calibrations where
∂BBBN
∂bg−1
< 0.
To see this we now study the terms in (44) relying on various approximations. We skip large
amounts of algebra - details are available from the authors. We show in bold the sentences where
the signs of the elements in the formula are determined.
Recall that from ABN we know ∆z < 0.
For a symmetric g denote µj = Pr ob(gt+j = g
i | gt = gi) for i = H,L. Standard calculations give
µj =
1+(2µ−1)j
2
.
54The first inequality follows from efficient taxes being in the increasing side of the Laffer curve, the second inequality
has been shown in section 3.4.1.
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As shown in Online Appendix A.1, log utility implies
∆p = βN−1(1− µN−1)
[
cH
cL
− c
L
cH
]
therefore ∆p < 0.
Using various Taylor approximations and ∆c ' c′g∆g, where c′g is the derivative in equilibrium
consumption with respect to g, we have
∆p ' βN−1(1− µN−1) 2c′g∆g/c˜
where c˜ is average consumption.
Taking derivatives with respect to τ and using Taylor approximations
(45)
∆′p
∆p
' c
′′
g,τ
c′g
− c
′
τ
c˜
where c′′g,τ is the cross derivative of equilibrium consumption with respect to g, τ.
This shows that the term ∆
′p
∆p
depends on various elasticities of consumption and that in general
equilibrium ∆
′p
∆p
is not zero.
To characterize further this expression note that equilibrium taxes τt = 1− vx,tuc,t for the utility in
section 5 imply ηc (1− g − c)−γ = 1− τt. Taking total derivatives in this equality we find
c′g =
−γ
x/c+ γ
< 0
c′τ =
−1
(1− τ) [1/c+ γ/x] < 0
c′′τ,g = −c′τ
γ(x+ c)
(x+ γc)2
> 0
Plugging this in (45) we have ∆
′p
∆p
> 0.
Now we turn to the term ∆
′z
∆z
. For the utility function at hand,
bg−1 = zH =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
µts
H +
cH
cL
(1− µt)sL
]
zL =
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
µts
L +
cL
cH
(1− µt)sH
]
using the approximation
(
cH
cL
sL − cL
cH
sH
)
' s˜
c˜
2(cH − cL)− (sH − sL) we have
∆z ' K1(sH − sL) +K2 s˜
c˜
2
(
cH − cL)
45
for constants
K1 =
∞∑
t=0
βt(2µt − 1) = 1
1− β(2µ− 1)
K2 =
∞∑
t=0
βt(1− µt) = 1
2
[
1
1− β −K1
]
Since optimal policy involves tax smoothing we take the appoximation τH ' τL to have sH−sL '
τ(∆c+ ∆g)−∆g, then
∆z ' K1
[
τ(c′g + 1)∆g −∆g
]
+K2
s˜
c˜
2c′g∆g
∆′z ' K1
[
(c′g + 1)∆g + τc
′′
g,τ∆g
]
+K2∆g
s˜′c′g2
c˜
(46)
where we use the approximation s˜ ' 0, which is approximately right if initial debt is close to zero.
However, note s˜′ = (1− x) + τc′τ is non-zero.
The sign of ∆′z is uncertain. Since the numerical calculations of Figure 12 shows that ∂B
BB
N
∂bg−1
is positive and as we know BBBN > 0 the bracket of (44) has to be positive for the calibration above.
As we have already shown that ∆
′p
∆p
> 0 and ∆z < 0 this implies that for our calibration ∆′z < 0.
However, it is easy to see that under the above approximations the term in brackets in (44) could
be zero or even negative. Consider, for example, the case when µ ' 1, that is when g is nearly a
constant. In this case K2 ' 0 so that, since c′g > −1 equation (46) means ∆′z > 0. Therefore
for very high µ we have ∆
′z
∆z
− ∆′p
∆p
< 0 and
∂BBBN
∂bg−1
< 0.
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Remaining Term (in quarters) Normalized Count
0 98.86%
1 0.70%
2-4 0.24%
5-9 0.05%
10-14 0.02%
≥15 0.13%
Notes: The table provides information on the redemption profiles of non callable bonds. The data are all non
callable debt issued by the US Treasury since the 1920s. ’Remaining Term’ counts the number of quarters
remaining until maturity when debt is bought back. When 0 this signifies that debt is bought at maturity.
The data are extracted from the CRSP.
Table 1: Remaining Term at Time of Buyback
Year Amount Issued (in millions) Share Called
1931 755 100%
1934 491 100%
1935 2611 100%
1936 5616 100%
1938 3588 100%
1939 1689 100%
1940 1404 100%
1941 9326 55.35%
1942 14061 38.06%
1943 16763 29.46%
1944 26986 14.16%
1945 28172 11.71%
1952 921 100%
1953 1606 0%
1960 470 0%
1962 365 0%
1963 550 54.55%
1973 1618 100%
1974 587 100%
1975 3616 100%
1976 1574 100%
1977 2638 100%
1978 4516 100%
1979 4523 100%
1980 7794 100%
1981 4626 100%
1982 3163 100%
1983 4921 100%
1984 16142 100%
Notes: The table lists (by year of issuance) the total amounts of callable bonds which have been called prior
to maturity. The data are extracted from the CRSP.
Table 2: Share of Redeemed Callable Treasuries by Year of Issuance
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Bond Term (in years) Call Window* (in years)
2 3 4 5 10 15
5 3 0 0 0 0 0
7 1 0 0 0 0 0
9 1 0 0 0 0 0
10 8 0 0 0 0 0
11 1 0 0 0 0 0
12 3 0 0 0 0 0
13 1 0 0 0 0 0
14 3 1 1 0 0 0
15 1 2 0 0 0 0
16 1 1 0 0 0 0
17 1 2 1 0 0 0
18 0 3 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 1 1 0 0
23 0 1 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 1 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 8 1 2
26 0 0 0 2 0 0
27 0 0 0 6 0 0
29 0 0 0 0 0 2
30 0 0 0 13 2 2
Notes: The table shows the call windows (maturity minus first possible call date) for callable bonds in the
US. The sample used is the same as the sample used for Table 2.
Table 3: Bond Terms and Call Windows
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St (%) σSt (%) ρ(S1,t,S1,t−1) ρ(b˜St ,˜bNt ) %St = 0 %St ≤ 0.1
US DATA 43% 7.8% 0.94 0.86 0 0
BuyBack
’Lend.’ 4·103% 3·105% 0.47 -0.01 - -
’No Lend.’ 12% 13.0% 0.86 0.46 13.1% 56.6%
No Buy back
’Lend.’ 76% 3·103% 0.42 0.87 - -
’No Lend.’ 48% 8.1% 0.92 0.92 0.01% 0.02%
’No Lend.+Coupons’ 51% 4.9% 0.90 0.94 0.01% 0.02%
’3 Bonds’ 31% 5.5% 0.81 0.93 0.11% 0.64%
Repurchases+
T Costs
’No Lend.’ 45% 9.0% 0.92 0.93 0.01% 0.01%
Notes: St denotes the share of debt of maturity less than or equal to one year over the total (market value)
of debt. St represents the average share and σSt denotes the standard deviation. The statistic ρ(b˜St ,b˜Nt ) is
the correlation between the market value of short debt and the value of long debt both divided by GDP.
The exact definition of the market values, varies depending on the model specification. For example under
buyback it holds that ρ(b˜St ,b˜Nt )
≡ ρ( pSt bStGDPt ,
pNt b
N
t
GDPt
). Under no buyback and no coupons b˜Nt ≡
∑N
i=S+1 p
i
tbt−N+i
GDPt
.
Therefore, when S = 1 the value of long debt outstanding is the value of all debt which in t is of maturity
greater than one year and b˜St is the market value of all outstanding debt less than one year maturity, divided
by GDP. The data counterpart is constructed applying this logic (see text).
%St ≤ x denotes the percentage of times that St is less than or equal to x.
Finally T denotes the transaction cost function specified in Section 6. See text for details.
Table 4: Moments: Data and Models
St σSt ρ(St,St−1) ρ(b˜St ,˜bNt )
std. of sample moment 0.0314 0.0139 0.0209 0.0354
Buyback
‘Lend.’ -1355 247540 22.44 24.65
‘No Lend.’ 9.87 -3.76 3.79 11.39
No Buyback
‘Lend.’ -10.52 -2744 24.83 -0.17
‘No Lend.’ -1.60 -0.24 0.92 -1.59
‘No Lend.+Coupons’ -2.55 2.05 1.88 -2.15
’3 Bonds’ 3.81 1.61 6.18 -1.87
Repurchases
‘No Lend.’ -0.65 -0.89 0.92 -1.87
Notes: The Table presents t statistics testing the hypothesis that the data moments are equal to the model
generated moments summarized in Table 4.
Table 5: t stats: Data and Model Moments
49
BB NBB
lending no lending lending no lending opt. repurch.
EEE1 ave -3.97 -3.72 -3.84 -3.86 -3.84
max -2.30 -2.28 -2.50 -2.64 -2.79
EEEN ave -3.18 -3.06 -3.53 -3.51 -3.18
max -1.81 -1.93 -2.55 -2.47 -2.12
EEEN−1 ave -3.23
max -1.94
Notes: The Table reports average and maximum Euler equation errors (EEE) for the benchmark models
(buyback/ no buyback, lending / no lending, and optimal repurchases). Additional moments and errors for
other models considered in this paper can be found in the Online Appendix B.3.
Table 6: Accuracy Tests
Figure 1: Share of Short Term Debt in the US
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Notes: The Figure plots the share of short maturity government debt (less than or equal to one year) in
the US over the period 1955-2015. The data are annual observations (time aggregated from monthly data
extracted from the CRSP). Details on the data construction are contained in the Appendix A.
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Figure 2: Total Issuance as a Fraction of the Market Value of Outstanding Debt
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Notes: The Figure plots the issuance of new government debt by year and in market value, as a fraction of
the total market value of debt outstanding in the United States. The data are from the CRSP and refer to
the period 1955-2015.
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Figure 3: Callable Bonds over Long Bonds in the US data
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Notes: The Figure plots the fraction of long term callable debt over total long term debt outstanding in the
CRSP sample.
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Figure 4: Callable Bonds: Timing of Buybacks and Call Windows
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Notes: The plots shows the timing of redemptions of callable debt in the US. The top left shows this timing
for bonds whose first call date is 2 years before maturity. The y-axis is in percentage points. Therefore,
roughly 75 percent of the bonds are redeemed 2 years before maturity, 15 percent 1 year and 10 percent at
the maturity date. The top right panel represents bonds with 3 year call windows, and the bottom panels
4 and 5 years, left and right respectively.
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Figure 5: Response of the Tax Schedule - No Buyback Model
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Notes: The Figure plots the tax rate in the single bond model without buyback presented in Section 3.4.4.
The solid line corresponds to a bond of one year maturity. The dashed line sets the maturity to three years
and the crossed line to 10 years.
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Figure 6: Model Simulations: Buyback and Lending
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Notes: The Figure plots a typical sample of the optimal portfolio under buyback. The bound on each
maturity is equal to 100% of steady state GDP. The lower bound constraint equals -100% of GDP.
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Figure 7: Model Simulations: Buyback and No Lending
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Notes: The Figure plots a typical sample of the optimal portfolio under buyback and no lending. The upper
bounds on short and long maturities equal 100 percent of steady state GDP. The lower bounds equal 0.
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Figure 8: Model Simulations: No Buyback and Lending
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Notes: The Figure plots a typical sample of the optimal portfolio under no buyback and lending. The upper
bounds imposed on the market value of short and long debt equal 100% of steady state GDP. The lower
bounds are equal to -100% of GDP.
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Figure 9: Model Simulations: No Buyback and No Lending
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Notes: The Figure plots a typical sample of the optimal portfolio under no buyback and lending. The upper
bounds imposed on the market value of short and long debt equal 100% of steady state GDP. The lower
bounds are equal to 0.
58
Figure 10: Models vs Data
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Notes: The solid line shows the average share of short term debt which was also shown in Figure 1. The
dashed line shows the fit of the no buyback model. As described in text we constructed this figure through
the following steps: First, we used model simulations to estimate the ’short debt share’ policy function,
regressing the share of short debt on its first and second lags, two lags of the market value of total debt
over GDP and the current value and first lag of the spending to GDP series. We also included higher order
terms of these variables to produce a ’good fit’ of the model’s policy function. Second, we fed the ’data
state variables’ to the model’s estimated policy rule, and obtained the dashed line shown. For the buyback
model (crossed line) we applied the same procedure. This gave us the crossed line.
Because of the inclusion of two lags of the share in the regressions, the years covered in the figure are
1957-2015.
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Figure 11: Model Simulations: Debt to GDP ratio and Repurchases
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Notes: The Figure plots the debt to GDP ratio (solid line) and the absolute level of repurchases (dashed
line) in model of Section 6.3. We used the sample of spending as in Figures 6 to 9. The upper bounds
imposed on the market value of short and long debt equal 100% of steady state GDP. Hence the market
value of total government debt can be as high as 200% of steady state GDP. The lower bounds of short and
long bonds are equal to 0.
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Figure 12: Numerical Derivative
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Notes: The Figure plots the numerical derivative
∂BBBN
∂bg−1
in the vertical axis and initial debt bg−1 in the
horizontal axis. See Appendix B for details.
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